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An Economic Analysis of Food Stamp Participation in West Virginia 
 
Ahadu T. Tekle 
 
Poverty and food insecurity are challenging socio-economic problems that policy makers 
are trying to address for a long time. Among other things, providing financial and in-kind 
assistance are some of the initiatives taken to improve food security for low income 
households. Food Stamp Program is an important assistance program that serves to meet 
this goal. The objective of this study is to examine the implication of economic and 
policy variables on food stamp participation in West Virginia. To understand the current 
and lagged impact of economic variables on current food stamp participation, static and 
dynamic econometric models are used. These models are estimated using panel data of 
West Virginia counties. Results indicate that county poverty, unemployment, and the cost 
of living directly affect the level of county food stamp participation; while employment 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION   
Despite the fact that the United States is one of the wealthiest nations, poverty-related 
malnutrition has been a long-standing social and economic challenge for researchers and 
policy makers. The number of people living in poverty has been increasing for the past 
years in the United Sates. According to U.S. Census Bureau report of 2005, the 
percentage of people live in poverty was 12.1, 12.5 and 12.7 percent in year 2002, 2003 
and 2004, respectively.  
Meeting nutritional needs is particularly difficult for poor families. In 2004, 11.9 
percent of all U.S. households were "food insecure" because of lack of resources. Of the 
13.5 million households that were food insecure, 4.4 million suffered from food 
insecurity that was so severe that they were classified as "hungry" (Nord et al., 2005). 
Food insecure households were uncertain of having or unable to acquire a supply of food 
sufficient to meet basic needs at all times because of inadequate resources (Winicki et al. 
,2002). Since 1999, food insecurity has increased by 3 million households. In 2004, 38.2 
million people lived in households experiencing food insecurity, compared to 33.6 
million in 2001 and 31 million in 1999.  
The high costs of housing, health care, and medical care coupled with low 
earnings create pressure on families who live on limited incomes. Among the household 
expenditures, the budget allocated to food is relatively more flexible than other expenses 
such as housing and medical expenses; thus, most likely food is often the first expense to 
be cut.  
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Since the mid-1940s, the U.S. Government has been committed to ensuring that 
its citizens neither go hungry nor suffer the consequences of inadequate dietary intake. 
For the past decades policy makers attempted to address the problem of low income 
households by introducing numerous assistance programs to improve the lives of low- 
income households. The Food Assistance Program, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicaid Program, are 
some of the assistance programs introduced to assist low income families. These 
programs have been a security for low-income households by providing financial and in 
kind assistance.    
Currently there are fifteen food assistance programs administered by USDA 
aimed at improving the nutrition of low-income households. In the year 2004, the total 
expenditure of USDA for food assistance programs totaled $46 billion, of which the  
Food Stamp Program (FSP), the National School Lunch Program, the Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infant and Children (WIC), the School 
Breakfast Program, and Child and Adult Care Program, were accounted for 94 percent of 
the total expenditure. During this time, the total federal funding for the FSP was $27 
billion, which was 59 percent of all domestic nutrition assistance funding. In 2005, more 
that 25 million Americans were receiving monthly food stamp (FS) benefits, a 40 percent 
increase since the start of 2000 (The Food Assistance Landscape, 2005). 
The FSP played a significant role in improving the well-being of a significant 
number of children who live in low-income households. According to the USDA reports 
for the past years, children (below age of 18) accounted for more than half of food stamp 
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benefits. For examples, in 2000, 8.8 million children received food stamp benefits out of 
the 17.1 million persons who lived in low-income households that participated in food 
stamp program (Winicki et al., 2002).  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
Food stamps are crucial to helping low-wage working families make ends meet. For 
example, a family of four supported by a full time, year-round minimum wage worker, 
will fall short of the poverty line by 25 percent (even after counting the earned income 
tax credit) if the family does not receive food stamps. Food stamps increase the typical 
monthly purchasing power of such a family by 39 percent (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2000 a). Although the Food Stamp Program is not designed to reduce child 
poverty, food stamps do augment the purchasing power of low-income households and 
can improve the well-being of people living in poverty (Jolliffe et al., 2005).  
The health of the general economy affects the food assistance programs. FSP 
participation tends to follow the unemployment rate, which is a key indicator of the 
health of the general economy. During economic downturn, FSP participation tends to 
increase as unemployment increases and income decreases (Hanson and Golan, 2002). 
On the other hand, during economic expansion, FSP participation tends to decrease as the 
employment rate and income rise. Hanson and Gundersen (2002) argued that general 
economic conditions influence the number of people that participate in the FSP. As 
household’s income increases, either fewer households are eligible for FSP participation 
or the level of FS benefits for eligible households declines. The general state of the 
economy influences the expectation of the individuals about their prospects regarding 
employment and income and, therefore, influences their decision to participate in the 
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FSP. Good economic conditions create the expectation of increased income, better 
employment opportunities, and future benefits hence, eligible households may be less 
likely to participate in the program (McKernan and Ratcliffe, 2003). 
FSP participation showed fluctuation over the years. As indicated in figure 1.1 the 
average number of FSP participants declined slowly from 1986-1989, however it grew 
substantially during the early 1990s. The average FSP participation declined through 
2000 since the peak in 1994, but began to rise in 2001. As illustrated in the figure 
unemployment and FSP participation follow similar trend, however, sometimes they 
diverge. For example between the years of 1992-1994, the average number of 
unemployed individuals declined but the average number of FSP participants increased. 
Similarly between 2002 and 2003, the average number of FSP participants was raising 
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Figure 1.1 Food Stamp Program participants, Unemployed Individuals and     
                 Individuals Living in Poverty (1985-2003) 1 
  
Similarly, FSP participation and poverty it closely related. As illustrated in the above 
figure, both had similar trend from 1985-2003 except in 1993, where the average number 
of FSP participants rise despite the average number pf people live in poverty declined.  
 
                                                 
1 Source: Cunnyngham and Brown, 2004 
 6  
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
West Virginia is one of the nation’s poorest states. Many parts of the state continue to 
experience high unemployment, a shrinking economic base, deeply rooted poverty, low 
human capital formation, and out-migration (Deavers and Hoppe, 1992). West Virginia 
ranks second to last in per capita income and lags the nation and the rest of the 
Appalachian region in almost every other indicator measuring income, employment, and 
wealth, making it a classical example of persistent poverty (Dilger and Witt, 1994; 
Haynes, 1996; Maggard, 1990; U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 a). Slow income and 
employment growth, out-migration, and the disappearance of rural households, are causes 
and effects of persistently declining public services and high rates of poverty. Lagging 
economic development negatively affects the economic and social well-being of West 
Virginia’s rural population and the ability of local governments to provide basic social 
services (Cushing and Rogers, 1996). These realities have not changed much in recent 
years. Recently, West Virginia has experienced very low level of per-capita income, 
sluggish economic growth, very low level of educational attainment compared to other 
states, loss of non-farm jobs and a rising unemployment rate (WV Economic Outlook, 
2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005). 
West Virginia has the fourth highest poverty rate following New Mexico, 
Louisiana and Mississippi. For the last four consecutive years the poverty rate was more 
than 16 percent higher than the national average rate of 12.4 percent. According to the 
American Community Survey Report (2005), in 2004, 371,000 people (around 20.4 
percent of the population) live in poverty in West Virginia. The poverty rate is even 
higher for children below the age of 18. According to the same report 70,000 children 
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(24.4 percent) under the age of 18 were living in poverty in 2004. However, little 
research has been done on the relationship between FSP participation and 
macroeconomic indicators and policy change at the state level. The main focus of this 
study is to examine the FSP participation and its relationship with demographic, 
economic characteristics and policy factors in West Virginia.  
 
1.4. OBJECTIVES   
The overall objective of this study is to examine the pattern of food assistance 
participation and its relationship to demographic characteristics, economic development 
and policy implications in West Virginia. The specific objectives are to: 
1. Determine the relationship between food assistance participation and macro 
economic indicators such as employment, unemployment, Income, poverty 
level and price index, and policy measures. 
2. Draw relevant policy implications from the empirical findings and analysis of 
the study.  
 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
Based on economic theory and previous study results, it is expected that the explanatory 
variables will have the following hypothesized relationships with FSP participation: 
Hypothesis 1: County employment growth (or decline in unemployment rate) reduces the 
proportion of county population dependent on food stamps. 
Hypothesis 2: Counties experiencing increase in per capita income face declining FSP 
participation. 
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Hypothesis 3: A rise in poverty rate in a county increases the proportion of county 
population participating in the FSP.   
Hypothesis 4: A rise in the cost of living (measured by the consumer price index) in the 
economy increases FSP participants. 
Hypothesis 5: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) is effective in reducing county FSP participants. 
  
1.6. APPROACH    
The study employs both static and dynamic econometric models to determine the 
relationship between county socio-economic conditions and food stamp caseloads. Static 
models enable the determination of economic relationships at a point in time. This 
property of static models allows the use of comparative static properties to study the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables at a particular point in time.  
Dynamic models help in understanding the relationship between variables over a 
period of time. In these models, the pattern of relationship among current and lagged 
variables over a number of years is established for empirical analysis.  
 
1.7. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY   
Chapter One includes the problem statement, background information, objective of the 
study, approach and organization of the study. Chapter Two provides an extensive 
literature review on the relationship between food stamp and economic and demographic 
factors. In Chapter Three, the theoretical background of individual decision to participate 
in the program is presented with the description of variables. Chapter Four illustrates the 
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model of estimation. Chapter Five the presents empirical estimation procedures and 
analysis of research result. Chapter Six summarizes the results, provides some 
conclusions, and addresses some limitation of the study and suggestion for future 
research.   
 





2.1 BACKGROUND OF THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM   
The first U.S. food assistance program was established during the depression of 1930s. 
The goal of the food assistance program was to stabilize farm prices and incomes.  The 
government purchased surplus agricultural products from producers and redistributed to 
the poor and, therefore, kept farm prices and incomes from declining. During the 1960s, 
the assistance program became independent of the farm assistance program and focused 
on the food and nutritional need of the society (Kuhn et al., 1996). 
 The Food Stamp Program began as a small pilot program in 1961. The program 
expanded during the 1960s and early 1970s, and finally reached nationwide coverage in 
1975. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 introduced the first coupon-based system which 
allowed program participants to buy a variety of food with coupons rather than restricting 
their consumption to surplus commodities. Participants purchased food stamp coupons 
for an amount based on income and household size and would receive some free “bonus 
stamp” (Fox et al., 2004). 
With the introduction of National eligibility standards in 1971, all states were 
required to inform low income households about the availability of food stamps. Due to 
the concern of low participation in the food stamp program, in 1977 the requirement of 
the household to purchase food stamp coupons with cash was eliminated. Under this act 
households would receive fewer coupons but did not pay for them. However, the 
 11  
elimination of the purchase requirement of coupons did not change the net dollar value of 
the subsidy received by the household (Kuhn et al., 1996).  
Direct changes to the FSP during 1980-98 were comparatively modest. In 1981, 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA 81) and the FS and Commodity 
Distribution Amendments of 1981 for the first time applied the gross income eligibility 
standards to all households not including aged or disabled members. The Farm Security 
Act of 1985 raised the asset limit to $2,000 for non-elderly households and to $3,000 for 
elderly households. In 1988, the Hunger Prevention Act reduced the maximum food 
stamp allotment incrementally from 200 percent to 103 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan. 
The Thrifty Food Plan, developed by USDA, serves as a national standard for a nutritious 
diet at low cost. It represent a set of market baskets of food that people of specific age 
and gender consume at home to maintain a healthy diet that meets dietary standards, by 
taking into consideration the food consumption pattern of U.S households. The cost of 
the meal plan for each category of gender and age is calculated based on average national 
food prices adjusted inflation. Furthermore, the cost of the market basket for a household 
is adjusted by the size of the household (Nord, 2005). 
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) was enacted.  PRWORA was the most significant social welfare legislation 
with direct and indirect implication on Food Stamp Program. PRWORA introduced a 3 
month benefit limit in every 36 months for able-bodied individuals (between the ages of 
18-49) without dependents who are not working or participating in approved work-
related programs at least for 20 hours. The Act also restricted eligibility of most legal 
immigrants except for some refugees, military personnel on active duty, naturalized 
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citizens, permanent resident aliens, veterans or their spouses.  Moreover, the act gave 
states power to reduce or eliminate food stamp benefits upon the failure of the adult in the 
household to comply with the rules of other public assistance programs (Wilde et al., 
2000). The act also reduced maximum food stamp benefit from 103 percent to 100 
percent of Thrifty Food Plan.  The Act also terminated the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Assistant for Needy 
Families (TANF), a new block grant (a financial aid package that grants federal money to 
state and local governments for use in social welfare programs) to fund state welfare 
programs.  
The FSP has undergone significant regulatory and legislative changes since the 
enactment of PRWORA. Some of the changes are aimed to reverse the previous rules and 
others are directed to increase states’ flexibility in their program administration. In 2002, 
the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 was enacted. The major changes 
included: restoration of eligibility to qualified aliens who have been in United States at 
least for five years, restoration of eligibility for immigrants receiving certain disability 
payment and for children regardless of their stay in the country, and it removed time 
limits on FS eligibility for refugees and people who granted asylum. The Act provides 
options for the states to simplify the program, adopt a simplified reporting system and 
providing transitional benefits for clients leaving TANF.  Moreover, the Act modified the 
standard deduction applied to income when determining benefit, so that the deduction is 
scaled to family size and indexed to inflation (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 2003). 
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2.2 FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT  
Food Stamps provide resources for individuals to buy certain food items from stores. The 
items that can be bought with food stamps include: food items from stores and meals 
prepared and served by authorized meal delivery service.  However, medicines, vitamins, 
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, pet food, non food items such as paper products and 
household supplies cannot be purchased with food stamps.  
 
2.2.1 Program Eligibility   
Not all low-income households are eligible for benefits from the FSP. There are certain 
financial and work-related requirements households must meet to be eligible for the FSP. 
Financial criteria include the gross income test, the net-income test, and the asset test.  
 A household’s gross income before taxes in the previous month must be at or 
below 130 percent of the federal poverty line to meet the gross income criteria. However, 
households with any member over the age of 60 or disabled are exempted from gross 
income test. In addition to these tests, households must have net monthly income at or 
below 100 percent of the federal poverty line to pass the net income test for eligibility. 
The maximum gross and net income that different household size should earn to qualify 
in the program is indicated in Table 2.1. In addition, income-eligible households must 
have liquid asset less than $2,000 to qualify in the program ($3,000 for the households 
with someone over age of 60 and households with a disabled member, as of 2002). 
However, in the determination of eligibility the value of a residence, personal property, 
earned income tax credit payments, life insurance, and pension assets, are excluded.  
Work related eligibility conditions require able-bodied household members to register for 
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work, accept suitable job offers, and comply with State welfare agency work for training 
programs (Fox et al., 2004).  
Table 2.1. Gross and Net Income Eligibility Standard, Effective October 2004 to    
September 2005. 
Household Size Gross monthly income 
 (130 percent of poverty) 
Net monthly income  
(100 percent of poverty) 
1 1,009 776 
2 1,354 1,041 
3 1,698 1,306 
4 2,043 1,571 
5 2,387 1,836 
6 2,732 2,101 
7 3,076 2,366 




 Source: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service 2   
 
However, some groups are categorically ineligible for the FSP whether or not 
they fulfill all the requirements for eligibility. These include, for example, people who are 
not citizens or permanent residents, postsecondary students, and people living in 
institutional settings. However, households in which all members receive Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or 
general assistance are exempted from both the income and asset test (Kornfeld, 2002) 
 
2.2.2 Program Benefits 
Eligible households are issued a monthly allotment of food stamps based on the Thrifty 
Food Plan, the national standard established by USDA for determining the low-cost 
nutritious diet for different household size. The amount of food stamp benefit the 
household receives varies by size of the household and is subject to annual adjustment for 
                                                 
2 http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#13 
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the changes in the cost of the Thrifty Food Plan. An individual household's food stamp 
allotment is equal to the maximum allotment for that household's size determined by 
thrifty plan less 30 percent of the household's net income. For example households with 
no countable income receive $393 per month in Fiscal Year 2005 for a household of four 
people, the maximum allotment for this household size. Table 2.2 shows the maximum 
amount of food stamp benefit for different family sizes as of October 2004 to September 
2005. 
 
Table 2.2. Maximum Benefit per Family Size from Oct 2004-Sept 2005 
Number in 
Household 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Each additional 
person 
Maximum 
monthly benefit  
149 274 393 499 592 711 786 898 +112 
Source: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service3  
The amount of FS benefit alloted for a given household size is uniform across the 
United States. All participants receive the same level of benefits based on their income, 
regardless of their geographic location (except in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands 
where benefit levels are higher because of higher food prices).
Historically, FS benefits were issued in the form of paper coupons. FS recipients 
used these coupons for food at authorized stores. In 1996, PRWORA mandated that all 
FS benefits be distributed via electronic transfers; therefore, FS benefits are now paid 
through Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT), an ATM-like card used to make food 
purchases at grocery stores by deducting the purchase amount from the recipient’s 
monthly food stamp amount. The use of EBT card is expected to help enhance security 
and reduce the stigma often associated with receiving food stamp benefits. EBT system 
                                                 
3 http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#13 
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became operational in all states at different time. For instance, only two counties of West 
Virginia adopt this technology in 2002 and by 2003, all counties started to distribute 
benefits via the EBT card.  
 
2.3 HISTORICAL TREND OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION  
The FSP participation rate “the percentage of eligible people who actually participate in 
the FSP” is an important measure of how well the program is reaching its target 
population. Not all of those who are eligible participate in the program as some choose 
not to participate, while others are not aware that they are eligible. 
Table 2.3 Rate of Food Stamp Participation (1976-2002) 
 Participation Rate (%) 
Year  Individuals Households 
September 1976 31.1 32.6 
February 1978 38.3 37.8 
August 1980 55.2 52.5 
August 1982 52.2 51.5 
August 1984 51.8 51.6 
August 1986 47.6 46.5 
August 1988 48.1 47.1 
August 1990 54.2 54.9 
August 1991 57.0 59.1 
August 1992 59.3 61.6 
August 1993 60.3 64.0 
August 1994 61.4 64.6 
September 1994 74.8 69.6 
September 1995 72.7 69.2 
September 1996 69.2 65.1 
September 1997 64.0 57.5 
September 1998 59.8 54.2 
September 1999 57.9 53.0 
FY 1999 56.2 51.7 
FY 2000 55.7 50.1 
FY 2001 53.2 48.0 
FY 2002 53.8 48.3 
Source: FS Program Operations Data. FSPQC (Food Stamp Program Quality  
             Control) Data, and CPS Data for the year the years shown. 
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Based on the data reported in Table 2.3, individual participation rates increased 
substantially in the late 1970s, from 31 percent in 1976 to 55 percent in 1980. FSP 
participation rates then leveled off, declining slightly to 48 percent by 1988. Through the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, FSP participation rates rose rapidly, peaking in 1994 before 
beginning a seven-year decline. Similarly household participation increased significantly 
in late 1970s from 33 percent to 53 percent in 1984. Household participation dramatically 
declined between 1986 and 1988, and substantially increased after 1990 until 1996. 
Participation declined each year after 1997 until 1999 and started to rise until 2002 as 
shown in table 2.3.  
 
 
2.3.1 Food Stamp Program Participation Rate among Subgroups  
 
FSP participation rates vary by demographic and economic subgroups. Historically, 
participation rates have been relatively high for individuals in households with very low 
incomes, children and TANF and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. 
Conversely, participation rates have been relatively low for households with elderly 
member (Cunnyngham, 2004).   
According to (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 2003), the majority (54 percent) 
of food stamp recipients was households with children in 2002. Of these households, 63.6 
percent were single parent households, 17.6 percent were headed by married parents, and 
10.8 percent had no members over the age of 17 participating in the FSP (the remaining 
8.0 percent were other multiple adult households with children). Households with the 
elderly member represented 18.7 percent of all food stamp households. Over three-
quarters of them (80.2 percent) lived alone and received an average monthly benefit of 
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$50. Households containing the elderly and other individuals, either elderly or non-
elderly, received an average benefit of $121. Over one-quarter (27 percent) of food stamp 
households contained disabled individuals. Of these households, over half (58.7 percent) 
lived alone, receiving an average benefit of $50. Households with the disabled and others, 
either disabled or non-disabled, received an average benefit of $187. Households without 
children, elderly, or disabled adults, received an average benefit of $122. Households 
with multiple non-elderly, non-disabled adults and no children received an average 
benefit of $201. Participation rates for different household characteristics for the period 
of 1994 to 2002 are depicted in Table 2.4.  
 
                  Table 2.4. FSP Rate, Number of Eligible Individuals and Participating Individuals among  
                                   Subgroups (1994-2002) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Individuals in All Households 74.8 72.7 69.2 64.0 59.8 57.9 59.3 53.2 53.8 
Age of Individuals  
  Children 89.6 86.8 85.6 75.7 70.7 67.9 71.8 69.1 70.3 
  Non-elderly Adults (18-59) 74.2 71.2 68.7 65.8 60.3 58.1 59.9 49.4 49.9 
  Elderly Individuals  35.7 36.1 29.7 29.8 30.9 32.9 30.7 28.1 26.9 
  Disabled Non-Elderly Individuals  49.0 53.6 49.0 54.1 52.5 59.3 53.1 44 46 
  Non-Disabled Childless Adults Subject to Work 
Registration  
47.7 41.3 37.0 40.1 24.4 24.9 27.1 19.3 20 
Non-citizens  66.8 66.0 64.5 77.7 63.0 49.4 44.7 37.2 43.7 
Citizen Children Living with Non-citizen Adults  80.5 59.8 58.3 38.7 39.3 45.6 38.1 37.2 43.7 
Individual in Households Without Any Non-citizens 
or Non-disabled Childless Adults Subject to Work 
Registration   
76.0 75.9 72.3 63.8 61.4 60.4 61.8 57.0 57.9 
Household Composition  
  Households with Children 87.2 84.4 82.7 74.6 69.8 67.1 70.7 64.7 65.4 
  Single-Parent  98.9 100.8 96.3 86.3 84.6 81.4 90.7 93.8 96.1 
  Married Couple 67.6 61.6 62.1 62.1 52.3 45.6 47.1 44.1 44.7 
  Other Multiple Adults 89.0 73.6 75.2 78.1 67.3 73.7 67.0 41.4 39.2 
  Children Only  78.1 62.9 80.3 36.6 36.6 44.5 39.9 46.3 56.5 
  Households without Children  45.8 45.3 40.3 40.6 38.6 39.4 38.0 32.9 33.2 
Source: FS Program Operations Data. FSPQC (Food Stamp Program Quality Control) Data, and CPS Data 
for the year the years shown. 
 
The FSP participation rate for the elderly (over the age of 60) has been generally 
low for the last decade. Based on FS Program Operation and CPS (Current Population 
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Survey) data participation rate was 36 percent in 1994 and fell to 27 percent in 2002. 
Similarly, participation rate of non-elderly adults were 74 percent in 1994 and fell to 50 
percent in 2000. The Household Characteristics Survey conducted in 2000 also supports 
the report of USDA 2002 regarding low participation rate of elderly as reported by 
Gunderson and Oliveira (2001). According to the result of the survey, out of the total 
participants, only 5 percent of the benefit is accounted by the household headed by 60 
years of age or older. Households with some of its members over the age of 60 years are 
less likely to be food insufficient than average households; therefore, these low levels of 
food insufficiency appear to influence their low participation rate (Gunderson and 
Oliveira, 2001). 
FSP participation for children generally had been higher than the other age 
groups. For the period between 1994 and 2002, participation was the highest in 1994 and 
lowest in 1999, 90 and 68 percent, respectively as indicated in table 2.4. Moreover the 
table indicated that over half of the total participants were children. More than half of the 
eligible non-elderly adults (18-59 years) had been participating from 1994 to 2002. Based 
on FS Program Operation and CPS data, Hanson and Gundersen (2002) reported that the 
participation rates in 1999 and 2000 were 58 and 60 percent, respectively.  
 
2.3.2 Food Stamp Program Entry and Exit  
It is a common phenomenon that FSP participants leave the program and re-enter again 
more than once in their life time. Rank and Hirschl (2003) noted that participating in the 
eligible food stamp program is very common for both children (age 1-20) and working 
age-adults (20-59). Their result indicated that 49 percent of the eligible children have 
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received food stamps at some point by the time they reached 20 years of age, and 51 
percent of eligible adults participated in FSP sometime between 20 and 65 years of age.              
Re-entry in FSP is a common practice.  Gleason et al. (1998) indicated that more 
than half of those who left FSP re-entered within two years. They also found that two 
third of the new participants are previously used food stamps, which suggests  that 
individuals who had previously received food stamps are more likely to enter the 
program in a given month than those who had never received food stamps. Using 1990 
and 1991 Survey of Income and Program participation (SIPP) data they found that about 
two thirds of all people who entered the FSP experienced a 20 percent drop in household 
income sometime during the four months before they started receiving food stamps. 
Similarly, about two third of those who stop receiving food stamps experienced a 20 
percent increase in income around the time they left the program. Furthermore, the study 
indicated that, about one third of the entrants had faced both a decrease in household 
income and some change in the composition of their households (such as departure of a 
spouse) during the eight months before they started receiving food stamp. 
Household’s structure such as marital status, race and level of education can 
influence FSP participation. Rank and Hirschl (2003) investigated the implication of 
household’s structure on FSP participation. The study noted that race, level of education, 
and marital status has a substantial influence on the probability that the individual would 
use food stamps.  The study also reported that African Americans, people who have not 
graduated from high school and children residing in non married households have a 
higher probability of using food stamp over the course of their lives. For example, 90 
 21  
percent of African Americans used food stamps at some point during their childhood 
compared with 37 percent of white children.   
FSP participation span might differ with regard to household structures. Single- 
females with children, elderly people with disabilities, and low income households  
whose members have not worked recently participate in FSP longer than the others.  
Furthermore, the increase in the unemployment rate and falling wages in the 
manufacturing industry leads to longer stays in the program for able bodied participants 
without children (Gleason et al., 1998).  
Previous studies employing static models found that the FSP participation rate is 
high among non-elderly and those who participate in other public assistance programs. 
Everything else held constant, those households receiving AFDC, living in poverty, and 
no longer receiving food stamps, are much more likely to re-enter the program than their 
counterparts. In addition, individuals in households with children (especially single 
parents with children) are more likely to enter the program than those in households 
without children (Gleason et al., 1998).  
 Based on the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), Zedlewski 
and Brauner (1999) reported that families receiving FS who had been on welfare left FSP 
at significantly higher rate than their non-welfare counterparts even if they appear to be 
eligible at all levels of income. The findings of the survey also showed that 62 percent of 
the former welfare recipient families left the FSP compared to 46 percent of non-welfare 
recipients. However, significantly more welfare families that left the program fell into the 
lowest income group - below 50 percent of poverty level - than the non-welfare receivers. 
In fact, the rate of FSP participation of former welfare recipient families that were 
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eligible for benefit was very low even at very low income levels. For instance, in 1997 
only 4 out of 10 families were participating (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).  
The study also identified the most common reason families gave for leaving the 
FSP. The major reason given by the respondents was increase in earning or finding a new 
job, including those with extremely low income. However, whether the families left the 
program based on their assumption of not being qualified for the program or they 
preferred to stop the program after they began working was unclear.  
The second most common reason given by the respondents for leaving the FSP 
was administrative problems. The poorest families in both the welfare and non-welfare 
groups were considerably more likely to leave the program due to administrative 
problems than relatively higher income families. The study also indicated that families 
that are not on welfare are more likely to give administrative reasons for leaving the 
program, which suggests that families without cash assistance are more likely to struggle 
to maintain the program requirement for eligibility. However, why former welfare 
families left the FSP more often than non-welfare families at similar income level is 
unknown (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).  
 
2.4 TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP CASELOADS (1994-2000) 
 
The monthly rate of participation in the FSP has fluctuated greatly over time due to 
changes in eligibility requirements, fluctuations in economic activity and improvements 
in the accessibility of program benefits, changes in other federal programs such as 
Medicaid, changes in federal immigration policy, and changes in the behavior of 
households. These various factors resulted in a rising caseloads during the late 1970s and 
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early 1980s, a declining caseload during the middle and late 1980s, a rising caseload 
during the early 1990s, and substantial declining after mid 1990s until 1999.  
The unprecedented decline in FSP participation during 1994-1999 attracts a great 
deal of attention from both policy makers and researchers. Several studies such as Ziliak 
et al. (1997); Blank (1997); Wilde et al. (2000); Grogger (2001); Martini and Wiseman 
(1997); Figlio et al. (2000); Jacobson et al. (2001); and Danziger (1999) documented that 
economic conditions were a significant factor in explaining the drop in FS caseloads 
during this period. Similarly, policy changes, such as the enactment of the Personal 
Responsibility Act of 1996, had also played a role to the decline in the food stamp 
caseload. The most direct impact of this policy change was the disqualification of the 
eligibility of some of legal immigrants and adults between ages 18-50 without-children.  
Gleason et al. (2000), using a multivariate model, investigated FSP participation 
caseloads for the same period of time and showed that 40 percent of the decline is 
explained by economic factors such as employment and unemployment rate, 2 percent by 
work requirement, 23 percent by TANF and the remaining is explained by other factors. 
Employing micro-simulation methodology, Jacobson and Puffer (2000) simulated the 
impact of economic change and pointed out that of the predicted 11.5 percent reduction 
in participation, 35.5 percent was explained by policy change under the welfare reform 
and 64.5 to change in unemployment rate. Wallace and Blank (1999) using both static 
annual and dynamic monthly food stamp caseload models based on state level panel data, 
found that food stamp caseloads strongly countercyclical with the state of macroeconomy 
and that the reform of AFDC led to weak decline in total caseload. Specifically, 
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economic condition such as employment and unemployment was responsible for 44 
percent of the decline and about 6 percent of the decline impacted by welfare reform.  
Wilde (2001) reported that detailed welfare policy change had little effect which 
ranged from 0 to 2 percent, while 23 percent of the decline was associated with the 
implementation of the 1996 welfare reform.  Likewise, Ziliak et al. (2000) estimated the 
impact of welfare reform and business cycle on food stamp caseload decline by 
employing dynamic model as a function of phase caseload, economic factors, AFDC and 
FS policies, political factors, AFDC caseload level, and unobserved fixed and trending 
heterogeneity. The results suggested that the robust economy substantially influenced the 
decline of FS caseload but the estimated aggregate effect of welfare reform was modest. 
Wilde et al. (2000) using state level data from 1994 to 1998 found that 35, 23 and 12 
percent of participation decline resulted from change in economic conditions, program 
reform, and political variables, respectively. Similarly, using household level data it was 
found that 28 percent of the change in the participation rate was associated with the 
decrease in the number of people with annual income below 130 percent of poverty line. 
Another 55 percent of the total change was due to a decline in the proportion of low 
income people who participated in FSP and the result was due to economic or policy 
change or both.   
FS benefits are now paid through an EBT card by deducting the purchased 
amount from the recipients’ monthly benefit. The use of EBT card protects the individual 
from revealing him/her self as a food stamp user to others in a way that the coupon does 
(Banks, 2003). The Ponza et al. (1999) survey found that non-participant eligible 
individuals were more likely to participate in FSP benefits if the benefits were provided 
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through EBT cards than coupons. However, with low checking account holding among 
low income households, the ATM type technology underlying the EBT may be a 
hindrance to some households (Hurst et al. 1998). Ziliak et al. (2000) indicated that states 
implementing EBT program experienced about 5.5 percent decline in their per capita 
food stamp caseloads, suggesting that the stigma reducing effect that should increase 
caseload in the presence of the EBT is dominated by technological barriers that prevent 
its use.  
 
2.5 FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION AND FOOD INSUFFICIENCY  
Despite the wealth of the nation and abundant food supply, and relatively low food 
prices, many households are food insecure or do not have assured access to enough food 
to meet their dietary needs for active and healthy lives. Food insecurity has been a 
significant public health concern. Lack of a healthy diet can affect people’s quality of life 
and result in poor health outcomes. 
 Food insecurity has been closely related to health problems including increased 
risk in the development of chronic diseases. Frazao (1996); and Pena and Bacallao (2002) 
showed that physically inactive adults with poor diets faced a high probability of heart 
diseases, cancer, strokes, high blood pressure, and diabetes. The impairment of 
psychological and cognitive function and obesity are the major health problems resulted 
from poor diet among children.   
For the last decades, evidence indicated that hunger and food insecurity have 
become a serious issue in the nation.  Based on Census Bureau survey, Nord et al. (2003) 
reported that food insecurity and hunger increased in USA in 2002 for the third 
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consecutive year. Food insecurity increased by 3.9 million people between 1999 and 
2002. Of the increased food insecure people, 2.8 million were adults and more than one 
million were children. In 2002, 11.1 percent of US households (around 35 million people 
from 12.1 million households) experienced food insecurity compared to 33 and 31 
million people in 2001 and 1999, respectively. About one-third of food-insecure 
households (3.8 million, or 3.5 percent of all U.S. households) were food insecure to the 
extent that one or more household members were hungry, at least some time during the 
year, because they could not afford to have enough food (Nord et al.,2003). 
There have been many initiatives by policy makers in identifying effective 
policies that can reduce food insecurity and address the food needs of vulnerable groups. 
To address this problem, 15 domestic food assistance programs administered by USDA 
have become the major safety net for children and low income adults in which food 
stamp has been the largest one.  
With some exceptions (asset and financial requirements) food stamps are 
available for all low income households and generally it is expected that low income 
families would be the beneficiaries of the program. However, Jensen (2002) indicated 
that not all households that experienced food insecurity participated in the food stamp 
program in the same year. For example, only 42 percent of the households that 
experienced hunger participated in FSP during the past year. This evidence indicates that 
many eligible households do not participate in the program and also many of the eligible 
non-participants may experience food insecurity. Multivariate analysis indicated that the 
degree of food insecurity is positively correlated with the likelihood of FSP participation, 
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and that the labor market and program parameters have a relatively larger effect on more 
food insecure households than on others.  
 The contribution of food stamps to reducing food insecurity has been studied by 
some researchers. Increase in food stamp benefit increased FSP participation and 
decreased the food insecurity with hunger according to Huffman and Jensen (2003). 
Their findings implied that FSP participation and food insecurity with hunger among low 
income and low asset households that are potentially eligible for FSP are sensitive to 
changes in program parameters (e.g., food stamp benefit). Further, their results suggested 
that greater reduction in food insecurity can be achieved through increase in FS benefit 
and improvement of macroeconomic conditions, 
 In contrast food insecurity was worse among food stamp recipients than among 
eligible non-participants and near-eligible individuals (Cohen et al., 1999). Their estimate 
unveiled that half of all the food stamp recipients experienced some kind of food 
insecurity. Similarly, by employing simultaneous equations, Gunderson and Oliveira 
(2001) indicated that food insufficient families are more likely to receive food stamps and 
FSP participants are much more than twice as likely to be food insufficient than non 
participants while treating the program participation as exogenous variable.  
Huffman and Jensen (2003) examined the relationship among FSP participation, 
labor participation, and food insecurity by employing a simultaneous equation model. 
They found that if the head of the family is male or married, then the probability that 
household participants in FSP is significantly lower and the probability that the 
household head works is significantly higher. They found lower FSP participation for 
married families, a negative relationship between food participation and labor supply and 
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negative relationship between food insecurity with hunger and labor force participation. 
Likewise, an additional hour of working leads to decreased FSP participation and 
increased food security. The marginal effects of one dollar increase in expected FS 
benefits on FSP participation is similar to a one dollar increase in minimum food 
spending needs: both increase FSP participation by approximately 0.10 percent points, 
(Jensen, 2002).  
Cross sectional studies have generated a variety of conflicting results. For 
instance, Rose et al. (1998) estimated the effects of different economic and demographic 
variables on food insufficiency using national sample data. They noted that food 
insufficiency fell with rising income, food stamp benefit, education, and with home 
ownership. They also found that household structure, race, and ethnicity are important 
factors in explaining food insufficiency.  
Similarly, single female headed households were 4 percent more likely to 
participate in the FSP and 5 percent more likely to be food insecure than others (Hanson 
and Golan, 2002). Winship and Jencks (2002) indicated that single mothers had higher 
rate of food insufficiency problem than married mothers, but both groups experienced a 
similar decline in problems over the late 1990s. Likewise, female-headed households 
were significantly more likely to be food insufficient than other households. In addition, 
disability status and changes in household’s composition appear to be associated with 
entry in food insufficiency. On the other hand, completing high school was consistently 
found to increase the chance of being food secure (Nord et al., 2003).  
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2.6 FOOD STAMP EXPENDITURE AND THE ECONOMY  
Considerable research has revealed that FSP participation is responsive to changes in 
economic conditions. During economic downturn, participation rates tend to increase as 
unemployment rate increased and income is reduced. On the other hand, during economic 
expansion FSP participation tends to decrease as the employment rate and income rises. 
Hanson and Gundersen (2002) stated that general economic conditions influence the 
number of people to participate in FSP in ways that as households income increase, either 
fewer households are eligible or the level of benefit for eligible households decline. They 
also pointed out that the general state of the economy influences the expectation of the 
individual about their prospects regarding employment and income and, therefore, 
influences their decision to participate in the program.  
Using CPS and FSP administrative data, Cunnyngham (2004) reported that FSP 
participation is substantially higher for individuals in the household without income than 
for individuals in the household with income. For example, in 2002, 67 percent of 
members in the household without income participated as compared to 50 percent of 
individuals in the household with income. Similar to this result, Ponza et al. (1999), using 
National Food Stamp Program Survey (NFSPS) collected between 1996 and 1997, stated 
that food stamp participants are more likely to have no earned income than eligible non 
participants. They reported that 52.7 percent of FSP eligible non-participant households 
have earned income as compared to 32.5 percent of participants. They also indicated that 
there is a negative relationship among FSP participation, number of jobs held, and 
number of hours worked by adult household member. 
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The opposite is also true; an economic downturn increases FSP participation since 
it creates low work opportunities, fewer hours of available work, and a higher 
unemployment rate (Hanson and Gundersen, 2002). Lower income implies that new 
households become eligible to participate in FSP and also families already participating 
in the program receive more benefits. However, they also indicated that the economy has 
less direct effect on the household participation whose members have limited attachment 
on labor force such as the disabled, elderly, and single women with young children.  
Hanson and Golan (2002) were also investigated the impact of food stamp 
spending on stabilizing the economy. These countercyclical changes in food stamp 
expenditure during economic boom and downturn can have beneficial stabilization effect 
to the economy, stimulating economic activity during recession and slowing demand 
during an expansion. The effect of FSP expenditure on the economy during economic 
downturn can be evaluated in terms of source of expenditure finance: expenditure 
generated through emergency or contingency funding, and funds generated through 
increased tax or other budget neutral financing.  
 At the time of recession, FSP expenditures increase through government 
emergency finance to provide more benefits to more households. The increase in 
spending by the benefit recipients due to the rise in FS expenditure stimulates production. 
The resulting higher production boosts labor market demand and household income and 
consequently the increase in income triggers additional spending. To understand the 
likely impact of additional expenditure in FS benefit, Hanson and Golan (2002) 
investigated the effect of recession-driven increase in FSP spending through emergency 
borrowing by hypothetically increasing the annual FSP expenditure by $5 billion (lower 
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than the actual spending increase). According to their estimate, the $5 billion rise in the 
FSP expenditure resulted in $1.3 billion increase in food items spending by the recipients 
of the households. By assuming that the households now allocate their previous income 
devoted on food to non-food items, they found that non-food spending increased by $3.7 
billion. Ultimately, the additional $5 billion expenditure triggered economic activity of 
$9.2 billion and increase in jobs of 82,100, out of which 8,800 jobs accounted for farm 
and food processing sector and 73,300 for nonfood sectors. Likewise, Hanson et. al. 
(2002) showed the role of FSP expenditure on farm and food processing sector by 
converting the FSP to cash assistance program. It was indicated that converting $18.5 
billion FSP to cash assistance would lead to a reduction in farm and food processing 
production of $3.5 billion, as households shifted expenditures from food to other goods 
and services.  
Hanson et al. (2002) also examined the possible implication of food stamp 
expenditure on the economy, especially on farm and food processing sector, if the 
program is financed thorough tax increment. They hypothetically increased both FSP 
benefits and personal income taxes by $5 billion. The increase in benefit due to rise in 
FSP expenditure resulted in rise in spending by recipient households in food and nonfood 
items. However, the rise in spending of the recipient households was offset by a decline 
in spending by tax paying households. As a result of increase in benefit expenditure 
through budgetary neutral spending by low-income households there was an increase by 
$1.357 and 3.608 billion on food goods and nonfood goods and services, respectively. 
Mid and high income households cut spending by $159 million and non food spending by 
$5.491 billion. Even though production increased in farm and food processing sector and 
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job increased by 7,870 due to the redistribution of the expenditure, total economy 
declined by almost $1 billion with a loss of 14,000 jobs. The non-farm and non-food 
processing sector of the economy declined, losing 22,270 jobs. Similarly, they 
investigated the effect of increase in personal income tax to finance FSP expenditure. It 
was estimated that increasing personal income taxes by $1 billion to offset the additional 
FSP expenditure resulted in an overall loss of 3,000 jobs and farm sales rise by $81 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION DECISIONS 
 
3.1 FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION DECISION  
Despite the potential value of food stamps, many eligible households do not participate in 
the program, and participation rates have dropped significantly in recent years. For 
example, it is estimated that 54 percent of eligible households participated in food stamps 
program during 1999–2001, which was lower than in 1994 with 70 percent participation 
rate (Zedlewski and Rader, 2004).  
Literature provides two general explanations regarding non-participation for the 
eligible households in the FSP. The first reason focuses on the unawareness or lack of 
information about the program and its potential benefit by low income families 
(McConnell and Ponza, 1999). If the households or individuals are unaware of the 
eligibility, they do not apply for public assistance program regardless of their expected 
benefit level or the relative direct and psychological costs of participation (Banks, 2003). 
Some needy households do not participate because they do not know about the program, 
or more likely, believe that they are not eligible for the benefit.    
Previous studies, for example, Coe (1986), agreed that lack of information played 
an important role for the low level FSP participation of eligible households. Using 
information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Coe (1986) indicated that 50 
percent of non-participating eligible households reported that lack of information was 
their primary reason for not participating in the program. Blaylock and Smallwood 
(1984) using 1979-80 survey of Food Consumption in low income households, indicated 
that lack of knowledge about the FSP, eligibility levels and application procedure were 
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the most mentioned reasons for non-participation. Kim and Mergoupis (1997) similarly 
reported that lack of information contributed for non-participating in FSP. Ponza et al. 
(1999) suggested that even prior exposure to public assistance program might not provide 
adequate information regarding the eligibility of the program. The authors found that 
almost three fourths of non-participating eligible households reported that they were 
unaware of their eligibility. Most households with prior participation in food stamp 
program also reported that they were unaware of their eligibility.    
Other researchers (Ranney and Kushman, 1987) indicated that households have 
sufficient information regarding the availability and benefit of the FSP but they decide 
whether to participate in the program or not after weighing the expected costs and 
benefits associated with FSP participation. If the expected benefit is higher than the 
expected cost, households will participate in the program, and vise versa. Non 
participation can be explained either by low expected benefit level or high expected cost 
of participation, or both. When the expected benefits are lower than the expected cost of 
participation, eligible households choose not to participate even though they may be 
entitled to modest assistance (Ranney and Kushman, 1987). Similarly, a recent study by 
Lerman and Wiseman (2002) suggested that costs and benefits of participation played an 
important role in making participation decision. Individuals participate in FSP if the 
utility of participation in the program is higher than the utility of non-participation.  
 
3.2 COST AND BENEFIT OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION  
Participation in FSP involves both benefits and costs to the eligible household. The 
primary benefit of FSP participation is that it provides households resources to purchase 
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nutritional food and improve their health. Once the household is eligible, the amount of 
FS benefit received is determined based on several factors such as: earned income, 
unearned income, allowable income deductions, household compositions, and year. The 
amount of benefit is higher for households with lower earned and unearned income as 
well as for households with higher income deductions such as shelter and medical 
expense.  
The compositions of households also determine the amount of benefit, as the 
amount of food stamp benefit increases with the number of persons in the household. FSP 
participation rates declined sharply with income relative to need and this income relative 
to need is a function of both household income and household size (Zedlewski and 
Brauner, 1999). The time period of food stamp receipt is also related to the benefit of 
participation as there have been changes both in policies and the amount of benefit of 
participation over time.  
Non-market costs (transaction and stigma) are involved in FSP participation 
decision. Transaction costs of participation include, but not limited to, out of pocket cost 
of transportation to public assistance offices, incremental costs of documenting additional 
family members, the time costs of going to the food stamp office and waiting in public 
assistance offices, and time spent to gather information and documentation for the 
program application. Ponza et al. (1999) indicated that individuals spend roughly an 
average of five hours applying for food stamps and two and half hours to recertify 
benefits.  
Loss of earning is also one of the costs the participant household faces since some 
workers may have to miss work in order to recertify for benefit during office hours. This 
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increases the opportunity cost of participation especially for those who work during 
traditional working hours as the food stamp office is open during the same hours. Due to 
the time taken for the intensive application and recertification process, the cost of 
participation for these eligible groups of people is very high (McKernan and Ratcliffe, 
2003).  Examining the relationship between FSP participation and detailed employment 
characteristics using data from 1990 and 1996 panel of Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) found that individuals in households 
where adults work traditional daytime hours are less likely to participate in FSP than 
individuals in the households where adults work in non-traditional hours. This implies 
that working in traditional day time hours makes it difficult for the individuals to go to 
office to apply and certify for the FSP. 
Participation in the program also causes a stigma4 cost or disutility to the 
household. Stigma cost may be incurred during the application and certification process 
(Ranney and Kushman, 1987). The applicant may feel stigmatized by being seen going 
into the food stamp office, being identified as a poor by others, or having to reveal 
personal information to workers.  Stigma cost may also occur as the person uses the 
coupon card every time store purchases are made.  
 
3.3 THEORETICAL MODEL OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION  
One of the basic assumptions in microeconomic theory is that rational individuals choose 
bundles of goods and services that maximize their utility based on, among other things, 
                                                 
4 According to Weisbrod (1970, pp 2-3) stigma is describes as  “ … the desire of the “poor” or “needy”  to retain self 
respect, dignity and acceptance from the rest of the society, and in particular the desire not have other people know 
about poverty,…(or) private life.”  
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income, preference, and relative prices. For FSP eligible households, utility maximization 
depends on income, preference, relative prices, program participation decisions, both 
benefits and costs associated with program participation and characteristics of the 
households. To maximize utility, the eligible household must first make the FSP 
participation decision and then determine the level of food demand (out of their income) 
and other non-food goods and services as part of income allocation process. Eligible 
households may make the rational choice not to participate in the program by forgoing 
additional resources from food stamps if the cost of participation in FSP is higher than its 
benefit. The following theoretical model of FSP participation decision is developed 
following Ranney and Kushman (1987).  
The utility function can be represented as: 
  ( , , , )Y SU U H F F R M= +                                                  (3.1) 
where Y S TF F F+ =  and ( , )SR R F M= ; H is a Hicksian composite of all non-food goods 
and services, YF  is food bought with cash, SF is food purchased with stamps, TF  
represents total food consumption from cash and food stamps, R is a composite 
representing the household’s status or prestige and M represents the household’s 
characteristics such as age, sex, educational attainment, status of the head of the 
household and other demographic characteristics.   
Throughout the discussion of this model, non-satiation (higher quantities provide 
greater level of satisfaction) and one decision maker per household are assumed. The 
household has Y level of income (income after taxes), which might consist of non-welfare 
earned income and cash welfare income (if any). It is assumed that the household has 
information regarding the FSP and they are eligible to participate in the program. 
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 The utility maximizing problem for FSP eligible household can be represented 
as:    
      ( , , , )Y SMaxU U H F F M R= +                                                                      (3.2) 
       s.t    'F Y HP F P H Y+ ≤           where    'Y Y C= −                           (3.3) 
           F SP F A≤                                                                                            (3.4) 
                ( , )SR R F M=                                                                                      (3.5) 
              0, 0, 0Y SH F F> ≥ ≥    and  0Y SF F+ >                                  
where FP  is price of food, HP  is price of the Hicksian good, Y is income, C is the 
transaction cost of participating in FSP, Y is transaction cost adjusted income, and A is 
total allotted amount of benefit. 0H >  indicates that non food items will be consumed 
whether or not food stamps are used by the household. 0YF ≥ shows that food items may 
or may not be purchased using cash or income. Similarly, 0SF ≥  indicates that 
households may not use food stamps and 0Y SF F+ >  shows that households consume 
food items by spending either their income and/or using food stamps.    
The utility maximizing household is constrained by the level of income (equation 
3.3) after accounting for the transaction cost of participation. The amount of food stamps 
allocated to the household is also constrained by the allotted amount of benefit available 
for that household as indicated in equation 3.4. Equation 3.5 shows the prestige or status 
of the household determined by the household characteristics, FSP decisions and usage of 
food stamps.  
The Langrangian equation of the constrained utility maximization problem can be 
expressed as: 
 39  
1 2( , , , ) ( ' ) ( )Y S F Y H F SL U H F F R M Y P F P H A P Fλ λ= + + − − + − .                                   (3.6) 
Since the constraints are expressed in terms of inequality expression, Kuhn–
Tucker conditions are used for setting the first order conditions. The Kuhn-Tucker 






λ∂ ∂= − ≤
∂ ∂








                                                                                                                      (3.8) 
2 0F
S S S
L U U R
P
F F R F
λ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − ≤
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂













λ∂ ∂= − ≤
∂ ∂











Y P P H
λ
∂ = − − ≥
∂














∂ = − ≥
∂








                                                                                                                  (3.16)                 
0, 0 0Y SF H and F≥ > ≥                                                                                              (3.17)                        
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Based on the first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, three cases are considered 
to examine the utility maximizing conditions for the participant household.  
 
Case 1: 0SF = (no food stamp benefits used): In this case, eligible households undertake 
the necessary procedure and certification. However, households prefer to purchase food 
with cash by allocating some portion of their income instead of food stamps. Since the 
utility maximization model considers net income after accounting for transaction cost 
associated with FSP participation, the decision of not participating in the FSP implies that 
the variable cost of the stigma is higher than the benefit of the stamp for these 
households.  
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In this case, 2 0λ = , which indicates that a marginal increase in food stamp allotment does 
not increase the household’s utility since the household does not use the food stamps to 
purchase food.  
The behavior of the household can also be expressed graphically in terms of 
indifference curves. Figure 3.1 shows the indifference curve of a household that does not 
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Figure 3.1. Indifference Curve of a Household not Using Food Stamps Despite being Eligible for 
                   Participation.  
 
 
The household consumes f0 and h0 level of food and Hicksian goods, respectively 
before and after participating in the program. The equilibrium point that maximizes 
utility is point a in both cases (before and after participating in the program). Even if the 
budget line of the household shifts by the amount of the food stamp benefit, the 
household retains the same utility level since the household does not use it.   
 





< < : In this case the household uses the food stamps but does not exhaust 
the entire amount. Given this condition, the optimal condition can be characterized as: 
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  0SF >   since some food is bought using food stamps. 
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Consider equation 3.9  2 0F
S S S
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P
F F R F
λ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂





∂ ∂ ∂= −
∂ ∂ ∂
.                                                      (3.18)                                                                                       
Since the household does not exhaust the entire food stamp allocation, A in 
equation (3.15) is not binding, indicating that the household’s food consumption is not 
constrained by the amount of food stamp allotment. Equation 3.18 indicates that the 
households purchase food with food stamps until the marginal utility of food purchased 
with food stamps is equal to the marginal disutility of the stigma associated with using 
the food stamps. The marginal increase in total benefit does not increase the utility of the 
household since the household does not use the entire food stamp benefit, the additional 
benefit from using food stamps might not have an effect on the utility of the household’s 
food consumption i.e 2 0λ = . Figure 3.2 shows the indifference curve of a household that 
does not use the entire benefit.  
Figure 3.2. Indifference Curve of a Household that Does Not Exhaust the Entire Food Stamp 
Benefit    
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Originally the household allocates its income among Hicksian goods and food 
items at equilibrium point of b by consuming f0 and h0 amount of food and Hicksian 
goods, respectively. After participating in the program the household only uses part of the 
allotted food stamps and spends the entire income on Hicksian goods.  The new 
equilibrium point that maximizes utility is point c where the household consumes f1 and 







=  In this case the household exhausts the benefit of food stamps. Two 
different scenarios are considered in this situation. Where 2 0λ = , which indicates that the 
household exhausts the entire food stamp benefit and even if the food stamp allotment 
increases the household does not use it, and 2 0λ >  indicates that the household uses the 
entire benefit and if additional food stamp is allocated, the household will use it.      
For the case where 2 0λ = , 0YF > and 0YF = , the household fully utilizes the 
allotted benefit and additional food may or may not be purchased using cash. Under this 
scenario, equilibrium occurs (for both 0YF >  and 0YF = ) at the point where the marginal 
utility of food purchase with food stamps equals to the marginal disutility of food stamps:   




∂ ∂ ∂= −
∂ ∂ ∂
. 
        For the case 2 0λ > , 0YF >  and 0YF = , the marginal increase in benefit increases the 
household utility. Again the household may or may not purchase food with cash. 
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.                  (3.19)                                                                            
Equation 3.19 implies that at equilibrium, the marginal utility from food stamps is greater 
than the marginal disutility associated with participation.  





= , from equation (3.14) ' HY P H=  which indicates that the 
entire income is allocated for non food items of other goods and services. This behavior 
of the household under this scenario is presented graphically in terms of indifference 
curves in figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Indifference Curve of a Household that Exhausts the Food Stamp Benefit but Does Not 
Spend Income to Purchase Additional Food 
 
Before participating in FSP program, the household used to consume f0 level of 
food and h0 level of Hicksian goods. Consumption of food and Hicksian goods increases 
after participating in the FSP. The household now consumes f1 and h1 level of food and 
      
U  
U0 
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Hicksian goods, respectively. The new utility maximizing level of consumption is 
achieved at point d. 





=   which indicates that the household allocates income to food and 
Hicksian goods. 







.                                                                    (3.20) 
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.                                                     (3.22) 
Equation 3.22 indicates that at equilibrium point the marginal rate of substitution 
between food and other goods and services is equal to their price ratio. Given household 
participation, the Marshallian demand for food out of income is represented 
as: ( , , ', , )Y F HF F P P Y A M= . Therefore, for eligible households, food demand out of cash 
is determined by the price of food, the price of other goods and services, income (after 
accounting to the transaction cost), amount of food stamp benefit, and characteristics of 
the household. 
Figure 3.4 depicts the indifference curve of a household that allocates income for 
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Figure 3.4. Indifference Curve of a Household that Allocates Income to Purchase 
Additional Food 
 
  Before participating in FSP, the household maximizes utility by consuming f0 and 
h0 level of food and Hicksian goods, respectively at equilibrium point of e. Now the 
household consumes the combination of food and Hicksian goods by allocating income  
for the two goods and participating in FSP. The amount of income allocated for both 
goods depends on the household’s preference of what to consume more. If the household 
prefers to consume more of food, it will allocate a higher proportion of income to food 
and the equilibrium point where utility is maximized would be closer to n. Similarly, if 
the household prefers to spend less on food and more on Hicksian goods, the utility 
maximizing equilibrium point will be close to point m. It is also possible that the 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EMPIRICAL MODELING OF FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION  
 
 
4.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
Participation in FSP is an individual’s or household’s voluntary decision to receive 
monthly benefit by fulfilling all the eligibility requirements. The theoretical model 
developed in chapter three explained that participation decisions by households depends 
on the household economic situation, such as income, the price of goods and services, 
stigma, food stamp benefit level, and composition of the household.  
Similar to other economic decision making, household participation in FSP 
involves a set of benefit and cost considerations. Chapter three discussed the 
microeconomic foundation behind FSP participation decisions. Households are interested 
in maximizing their utility from the consumption of goods and services and from 
participation in FSP that generates a flow of benefits.  
 Income, household composition, household employment, the cost of food and 
other goods and services, and other household characteristics are important parameters 
that affect FSP participation decisions of a household. Although the combination of 
declining income and change in household structure generally lead to FSP participation, 
income change triggers most movement into and out of the FSP (Gleason et al., 1998). 
Household characteristics in terms of poverty level, employment status, family structure, 
for example number of dependants, are also important in determining criteria that can 
affect the economic decision of participation in FSP. 
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Direct observation of these household socio-economic parameters that influence 
FSP participation decisions requires detailed survey data. This approach provides an 
understanding of the relationship between household economic conditions and FSP 
participation decisions using micro-level household modeling method, like logit and 
probit models. The interest of the present study is rather to abstract from household-level 
FSP decision modeling to a more general county level macro modeling of FSP decisions 
that may have relevant bearing on welfare program policies. However, such transition 
from micro-level modeling to macro-level modeling first requires establishing proper 
links between micro-level economic parameters and ways to observe them using 
generalized data.  
Household income is an important variable in understanding FSP participation 
patterns. To account for this household economic variable, county per capita income is 
used to measure the county level relationship between income and FSP participation. 
This study assumes that county level per capita income trends reflect the county’s level 
household income. 
Another economic factor that might determine household’s FSP participation 
decisions is household employment status. This study uses county level of employment 
and unemployment growth rate variables as proxies for household employment and 
unemployment status, respectively. The effectiveness of county level employment and 
unemployment growth rate as a proxy for household employment depends on how cycles 
in county employment and unemployment reflect similar patterns at the household level.  
Aside from income and employment, the household FSP participation decision is 
affected by the degree of household poverty. As a direct extrapolation, the county level 
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measure of poverty is used as a proxy variable for household poverty levels. It is 
measured as the percentage of persons in a county that are in poverty.  
As a direct proxy for household FSP participation, the percentage of people who 
participate in the FSP out of the total population in that county is introduced. As a proxy 
variable, it is more likely that the county level percentage of FSP participation captures 
household level participation decisions.  
To empirically analyze the impact of economic and policy factors on FSP 
participation, two econometric models are used: static and dynamic models. In the static 
model, the explanatory variables for period, say, t= j (j=1,…,n) are assumed to affect 
participation in the same period, t=j. In the dynamic model, the dependent variable (FSP) 
depends on lagged participation in period t-j (where j represent the number of lags, and  
j=1,…n), lagged macroeconomic variables as well as current macroeconomic and policy 
variables are used. The rationale for using the dynamic model is that an event in one 
period may affect program participation for several subsequent  periods due to lags in the 
adjustment of economic variables.                                                                                                                                                                      
Both static and dynamic econometric models of the study are developed following 
the models and approaches employed by Wallace and Blank (1999), Figlio et al., (2000) 
and Ziliak et al., (2003). These studies developed both static and dynamic models to 
examine the impact of economic variables, policy, and political variables on food stamp 
caseloads using nationwide state panel data. In their empirical estimation, they 
considered food stamp caseload as the dependent variable and many independent 
variables such as employment growth rate, unemployment rate, welfare reform indicator, 
EBT (Electronic Benefits Transfer) indicator, a vector that indicated the political 
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environment of each state, able-bodied adult without dependent (ABAWD) wavier, and 
other variables.    
In this empirical study, static and dynamic models are developed to test the 
relationship between FSP participation and county level economic and policy variables in 
West Virginia. The empirical models and data collection are discussed in the following 
sections. 
4.1.1 Static Model  
In the static model, given a general model it it it iY Xβ ε= + , the effect of the independent 
variables X at year t on the dependent variable Y at the same period is examined. The 
presumption of the static model is that prior events that occurred in lagged periods do not 
significantly affect the present event, or mathematically cor(Yt, Xt-1) = 0, where cor refers 
to correlation, Yt is the dependent variable at time t, and Xt-1 is all the lagged explanatory 
variable arguments that can be introduced in the model.  A zero correlation in this case 
means that the dependent variable Y is independent of the influence of lagged explanatory 
variables. 
A number of explanatory variables are introduced for empirical estimation. For 
empirical estimation, panel data (time series and cross-section) is introduced for all 
variables. The macroeconomic variables included are county level unemployment rate, 
employment growth rate, per capita personal income, percentage of county population 
under poverty, and consumer price index. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PROWRA) is also included to capture the policy variable. 
However, even if EBT is another policy variable it is excluded from the model as this 
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policy is introduced in 2002 in West Virginia and no sufficient time is covered by this 
policy for estimation of its impact on FSP participation.  
  
 
The static empirical econometric model can be specified as:  
      ( , , , , , , , )itit it it it it it itFSP f UEMPR EMPG PCPI POV CPI PRWORA GOV t=                 (4.1) 
 
Where itFSP   = percentage of population participating in food stamp program   
                          in county  i in year t 
 
       itUEMPR = unemployment rate in county i in year t 
       itEMPG   = employment growth rate in county i in year t 
          itPCPI = per capita personal income 
 
           itPOV = percentage of people living in poverty in county i in year t.  
             CPit = consumer price index at time t 
    PRWORAt =  Personal Responsibility And Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act    
                                 of 1996 
 
 GOVt = political affiliation of governor in office at time t  
                 t  = trend variable 
         i and t =  represents counties and year (time), respectively 
The functional relationship in equation (4.1) hypothesizes that food stamp 
caseloads are a function of employment and income opportunities, welfare reform, 
proportion of the county population living in poverty, general price level, and a time 
trend variable.  
 From equation (1), a static model can be specified as: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8it it it it it t t t iFSP UEMPR EMPG PCPI POV CPI PRWORA GOV t uβ β β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + + +  (4.2) 
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 This model is estimated using least-squares-dummy-variable method, which is 
discussed further in chapter 5. 
 
4.1.2 Dynamic Model  
Though the static model is important in examining the relationship between socio-
economic variables and FSP participation, the argument that past socio-economic 
conditions may not affect current FSP levels makes the model restrictive.  
Last period economic performance may affect the current FSP participation 
decision and eligibility. For example, lagged unemployment and employment rates may 
affect the current FSP participation decision and eligibility. Since most of the food stamp 
recipients are characterized as low skilled and less educated, therefore, they are less 
likely to be employed instantaneously as the economy booms (McKernan, 2003). 
Unemployed people may not also be eligible in the program instantaneously, rather after 
adjusting down or lowering their initial asset level to the eligibility requirement so that 
they become eligible in the program (Figlio et al., 2000; Ziliak et al., 2002). Hanson and 
Gundersen (2002) also explained the effect of lagged unemployment on current FSP 
participation. For some people who lose their jobs during economic downturn, 
unemployment insurance benefits offset a portion of the lost earning. As a result, many 
households or individuals remain ineligible for the program. However, the FSP is 
particularly important for many workers not covered by unemployment insurance, 
particularly those in low wage jobs. Conversely, during economic expansion, the FSP 
participation does not respond instantaneously as new employed persons may not quickly 
exit FSP until program participation is renewed (Ziliak et al., 2003). 
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Unlike static model, the use of dynamic model makes it possible to see the effect 
of economic changes beyond the current period. The dynamic model assumes that food 
assistance recipients of this year are more likely to be food stamp recipients next year 
than those not receiving food stamp this year (Hanson and Gundersen, 2002; Figlio et al., 
2000). Lagged FSP is used as control variable for the implication of previous year 
participation decision on current decision.  
A dynamic model also captures the delay of non-recipients to enroll in the 
program after becoming unemployed. A dynamic model allows the sluggish adjustment 
of food stamp participation to lagged food stamp participation, unemployment rate, 
employment rate, per capita income, and cost of living. Hence, the assumption that past 
socio-economic patterns may not affect current period FSP is relaxed. In a dynamic 
model, cor(FSPt, Xt-1)  0. The impact of past socio-economic variables may be equal or 
different from zero. The statistical significance of these variables being equal to zero or 
different from zero can be tested after estimation of the dynamic model. 
 The dynamic model of FSP participation is specified as follows: 
     ( , , , , , , )it it j it j it j it j it j t jFSP f FSP UEMPR EMPG PCPI POV CPI R− − − − − −=                  (4.3) 
where ( , , , , , , , )it it it it t t tR f UEMPR EMPG PCPI POV CPI PRWORA GOV t=   and  
            j = 1, 2, 3...6     
Since the data covers seven years, the maximum lag that can be introduced is six lag 
period.  
Following equation (4.3), the dynamic estimation model can be specified as: 
  13
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 1 0 0 0 ( 7)
it
J J J J J J n
it j it j it j it j it j it j n it
j j j j j j n
FSP UEMPR EMPG FSP PCPI POV CPI R
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=
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= = = = = = =
= + + + + + + +           (4.4) 
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where           
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7)
n it it it it it it it itR UEMPR EMPG PCIP POV CPI PRWORA t u
β
β β β β β β β β
=
= + + + + + + +
 
 
where  it jFSP − denotes lag FSP  
it jUEMPR −  = lag unemployment growth rate  
   it jEMPG − = lag employment growth rate   
     it jPCPI − = lag per-capita Income  
      it jPOV − = lag level of Poverty measured in terms of percentage of people who  
           live in poverty 
             
      t jCPI −  =  lag consumer price index 
Thus, this dynamic model integrates the static model variables and develops a 
lagged variable argument for FSP, unemployment rate, employment growth rate, and 
poverty. 
 
4.2 METHOD OF ESTIMATION  
 
Both static and dynamic models use county level panel data. As such, estimation of the 
two models needs to take into account the econometric methods applied to panel data 
models. Panel data models provide regression analysis with both spatial and temporal 
dimensions. The spatial dimension shows a set of cross-sectional units or observations. In 
this case the spatial dimension represents West Virginia counties. The temporal 
dimension pertains to periodic observation of a set of variables characterizing the cross-
sectional units over a particular span of time.   
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Panel data can be used to deal with heterogeneity in cross-sectional observations. 
In any cross-section, there might be many unmeasured explanatory variables that affect 
the behavior of the cross-sections being analyzed. Cross-sectional heterogeneity may 
indicate that there could be many unmeasured variables that influence the dependent 
variable. This phenomenon suggests that pooled OLS is a biased estimator unless the 
influence of this omitted variation (embodied in different intercepts) is uncorrelated with 
the included explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2006). 
         There are two types of estimation approaches for panel data models: pooled 
regression method and fixed effects estimation method. The pooled regression method is 
based on the assumption that all coefficients of the explanatory variables and the 
intercept considered in the model are constant for all counties across time. This method 
of estimation assumes homogeneity, i.e., all counties are not different from one another in 
fundamental unmeasured ways.  This restricted assumption might distort the true picture 
of the result since all counties might not possess similar characteristics that do not change 
over time (time-invariant). The specifications of pool regression method for static and 
dynamic model are the same as the specification shown in equations 4.2 and 4.4, 
respectively. 
However, in reality counties may possess different time-invariant characteristics. 
For example, demographic composition such as race, gender, religion, etc are time-
invariant variables that do not change over time and the distribution might not be the 
same in each county. As indicated in chapter 2, FSP participation is different among 
different demographic groups based on marital status of the household, age, and race. 
Historical data suggested that FSP participation is higher among single parents and 
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children but participation is lower among seniors. Similarly, FSP participation is also 
different among racial groups.  
Counties may have different demographic composition. For example, the 
proportion of single-parent households living in one county might differ from the other 
county. The same might hold true for other demographic characteristics such as race and 
age. Differences in demographic composition among counties might lead to differences 
in FSP. Therefore, in addition to the economic and policy factors, county specific time- 
invariant factors might affect FSP. Based on this discussion, county homogeneity 
assumption of pooled regression method might not be valid.  
The fixed effects method of estimation relaxes the county homogeneity 
assumption by accounting for county differences. The fixed effects estimation method for 
static and dynamic models is specified in equation (4.5) and equation (4.6), respectively.  
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9it it it it it it it it t i iFSP UEMPR EMPG PCPI POV CPI PRWORA EBT GOV t a uβ β β β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + + + + +   (4.5) 
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The fixed effects method of estimation introduces the variable ia  for both static 
and dynamic models. This variable captures all unobserved time-invariant variables that 
may affect the dependent variable.  
Estimation of the variable ia  necessitates the introduction of dummy variables for 
all cross-section observations in the model. Dummy variable of each cross section 
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captures the effect of county’s time-invariant variables on food stamp participation. The 
inclusion of dummy variables will eliminate ia  and the impact of time-invariant variables 
reflected on intercept and introduced dummy variables. The approach this study follows 
to introduce dummy variables in the model is discussed in chapter 5.  
Some variables such as EBT, demographic characteristics (such as proportion of 
single headed households, elderly, disabled) are important variables that might affect 
food stamp participation decision beside economic and policy variables. The introduction 
of EBT in the model would expect to control the stigma cost associated with FSP 
participation. However, the data that this study relies on is limited before EBT became 
functional in all West Virginia counties, therefore, the model does not control for the 
effect of EBT on FSP participation. Similarly, due to unavailability of data, demographic 
characteristics are not included in the model. However, the impact of these variables is 
accounted by the variable ia .  
  
4.3 TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA     
The study of FSP participation and the factors that determine the individual or the 
household participation in the program needs to examine the economic, policy, and 
demographic factors and their interaction with FSP. The need for identifying factors that 
influence FS participation necessitates extensive data collection and organization.  
In this study, the employment growth rate and unemployment rate of each county 
is used to examine the impact of economic cycles on FSP. Both employment and 
unemployment variables are based on time series data included in the model to capture 
the labor market condition of West Virginia counties. Also, to examine the impact of 
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poverty level on FSP, data on percentage of county population who live in poverty is 
collected.   
Policy change is another important variable that is considered in the model. The 
policy variable is constructed as a discrete dummy variable that corresponds to the 
enactment and implementation of the policy at a given time period. For the time period 
prior to the introduction of PROWRA, the dummy variable is assigned a value of 0 and 
for the time period from 1997 to 2002, it is assigned a value of 1.  
The political variable measures the political climate in West Virginia over the 
period under consideration. States cannot propose major policy changes or directly alter 
FSP eligibility or payment rules through state legislation or regulation (Wallace and 
Blank 1999). However, this study incorporates this variable to test whether people’s 
perception of FSP participation differs with political affiliation of governors. 
 In this study, a dummy variable is introduced to account the political affiliation 
of West Virginia’s governors. The values of dummy variable assigned for democrat 
governor is 1 and 0 for republican governor. The goal is to test whether food stamp 
program participation decision is influenced by governor’s political affiliation.  
For the purpose of empirical estimation, the study uses panel data. Panel data is 
compose of both cross-section and time series data. The study uses all 55 counties of 
West Virginia as a cross-section and considered 7 years of observations (1995, 1997-
2002).  
 County level time series data for each variable included in the model is collected 
from different sources. Table 4.1 presents the variables with their respective data sources.  
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Table 4.1.Sources of data. 
 
Types of Data  Sources of Data 
Population by county  WVBEP, Census Bureau 
 
Employment and Unemployment by county  WVBEP & BBER  
 
Per capital Personal  Income by county  WVBEP 
 
Poverty by county US Census Bureau 
 
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) by county WVDDHR 
 
FSP by county WVDDHR & USDA 
 
Consumer Price  Index WVBEP & BBER  
 
PROWRA (Personal Responsibility and Work 




Governor  NGA   
 
 Note: WVBEP = West Virginia Bureau of Employment Program 
  BBER = Bureau of Business and Economic Research 
        WVDDHR = West Virginia Department of Health & Human Service 
               USDA = United States Department of Agriculture 
                 NGA = National Governors Association 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES  
Determining the appropriate estimation method is very important in finding unbiased 
results. Two types of panel analytic methods of estimation: pooled regression method and 
fixed effect method are considered. Pooled method of estimation assumes county 
homogeneity; however, fixed method of estimation assumes county heterogeneity.  
The fixed effect model is estimated using the Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) method. LSDV method of estimation captures the unmeasured time-invariant 
variables that may explain FSP by specifying dummy variables for each county. The 
introduction of dummy variables controls for fixed effect variables ia  as shown in 
equation 7 and 8 of chapter 4. To avoid dummy variable trap (i.e., the situation of perfect 
collinearity) in the estimation, n-1 dummy variables, where n represents number of 
counties, are introduced.  
 Aside from the advantage of fixed effect method that recognizes the fact those 
counties may have their own specific characteristics or unobserved differences, this 
estimation method has its own drawbacks when large numbers of cross-sectional 
observations are introduced in the model. A large number of cross-sectional observations 
require large number of dummy variables to represent each cross-sectional observation. 
Introducing many dummy variables into the model reduces the degrees of freedom for 
statistical testing. In addition, the introduction of too many dummy variables in the model 
might create multi-collinearity problem which makes difficult for precise estimation of 
one or more parameters (Gujarati, 2003). 
 61  
 All fifty five West Virginia counties are considered in this study. In order to 
avoid significant decline in the degree of freedom estimation, counties are geographically 
categorized into five regions; eastern, western, northern, southern and central. Eastern 
region comprises of eleven counties (Berkeley, Grant, Hampshire, Hardy, Jefferson, 
Mineral, Morgan, Pendleton, Pocahontas, Tucker, Randolph), Western region constitutes 
ten counties (Cabell, Jackson, Kanawha, Lincoln, Mason, Putnam, Roane, Wayne, Wirt, 
Wood), Northern region comprises fifteen counties (Barbour, Brooke, Doddridge, 
Hancock, Harrison, Marion, Marshall, Monongalia, Ohio, Pleasants, Preston,  Ritchie, 
Tyler, Taylor, and Wetzel), Southern region constitutes eleven counties (Mingo, 
McDowell, Mercer, Wyoming, Logan, Boone, Fayette, Raleigh, Summers, Monroe, and 
Greenbrier), and Central region comprises eight counties (Braxton, Calhoun, Clay, 
Gilmer, Lewis, Nicholas, Upshur, Webster) 
Using Ordinary Least Square method, both pooled (restricted approach) and fixed 
effect (unrestricted approach) static and dynamic models are estimated. To determine 
which model, restricted or unrestricted, fits the panel data better, a restricted F test is 
employed. Using this test, it is found that the fixed effect model with regional dummies is 
statistically significant for both static and dynamic models as indicated in Appendix A-1 
and A-2, respectively.   
Pooled data provide more information, efficiency, degrees of freedom, and more 
variability compared to the uncombined cross-section and time series observation 
(Gujarati, 2003). However, since the pooled data involve both the cross-section and time 
dimensions, statistical problems such as heteroscedasticity due to cross-section 
observations and autocorrelation due to time series observations are more likely to exist.  
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There are many ways of detecting the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
empirical results. Very often, the nature of the observations suggests whether or not 
heteroscedasticity is likely to encounter. In cross-sectional data involving heterogeneous 
units, heteroscedasticity is a rule rather than an exception (Gujarati, 2003). White’s 
General Heteroscedasticity Test is used to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity for 
both estimations. The result significantly indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(See  Appendix C). 
There are numerous ways of correcting for heteroscedasticity problem. For the 
purpose of this research, the heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error method is used. 
This technique will correct the standard error without altering the estimated coefficients. 
Since the problem of heteroscedasticity is decreasing the efficiency of the estimation 
model without creating bias on the estimated coefficients, correcting for heterosedasticity  
will provide more accurate standard error; therefore improve standard error estimation of 
coefficients. All empirical results reported in Tables C-1 and C-2 are reported after 
correcting for heterosedasticity. 
Another statistical problem that commonly exists in pooled data is 
autocorrelation. The nature of the observations may suggest the presence of 
autocorrelation. One of the methods of detecting the presence of autocorrelation is using 
the Durbin Watson (dw) statistic reported along with other econometric software outputs. 
The dw for static model estimation suggests that there is autocorrelation problem. 
However, dw is not a good indicator of the presence of autocorrelation when the model 
includes lagged explanatory variables (see Table D-1). Breusch-Godfrey test is applied to 
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detect the presence of autocorrelation in the dynamic model. The empirical results 
indicated that there is serial correlation problem as showed in Table D-2.   
One problem with autocorrelation is that it increases the standard error of the 
estimates and as a result the estimates will be inefficient, even though estimated 
coefficients remain unbiased. Correcting autocorrelation improves efficiency of the 
estimation. 
The presence of multi-collinearity is also examined using Pair Wise Correlation 
Matrix. Pair Wise estimation for static and dynamic model is reported in Appendix B. 
Estimates in the presence of multi-collinearity remain unbiased, however, the variance 
and the standard errors increase, as a result, the probability of obtaining the estimated 
coefficient significantly different from the true estimate is high (Gujarati, 2003).  One of 
the recommended solutions is dropping highly correlated variables or “doing nothing”.  
In the static model, the Pair-Wise correlation matrix doesn’t indicate is the 
existence of a serious multi-collinearity problem. However, in the dynamic model, when 
one period lag is introduced, some variables show high correlation with their lag, but the 
signs of the coefficients were as expected. Since lagged variables are important in 
controlling sluggish adjustments of the economy, and since most of the signs are 
theoretically consistent, no variable is dropped. 
  However, when two periods lagged variables are included in the model, very 
high correlation is evidenced between current and lagged variables and resulted in a poor 
fit. Most of the coefficient estimates exhibit unexpected and theoretically inconsistent 
results. As a result of the serious multi-collinearity problem, estimation of the dynamic 
model is restricted to only one period lags.      
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5.2 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
5.2.1 Static Model Results  
The estimated coefficients of the static model are presented in table 5.1. The adjusted R-
square indicates that 74.6 percent of the variation of the static model is explained by the 
explanatory variables specified in the model.   
The empirical result indicated that unemployment rate (UEMPR) is positively 
related with FSP. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent significance level. A one unit 
increase in unemployment growth rate is expected to increase FSP participants by 0.42 
percent, holding other explanatory variables constant. FSP participation is responsive to 
the change in county’s unemployment rate; therefore, FSP participation level is expected 
to increase in counties with high unemployment rate and decrease in counties with low 
unemployment rate. This result verifies the hypothesis that an increase in unemployment 
rate increases FSP participation levels, and vice versa. 
Employment growth rate (EMPGR) has no significant effect on FSP. This result 
contradicts with the stated hypothesis that an increase in employment decreases FSP 
participation. The result indicates that people might use FS despite the fact that 
employment opportunities are expanding. There might be a number of possible 
explanations for the result. The expansion of employment in the counties might create 
employment opportunities for the working poor and increase their earnings. However, 
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Table 5.1. Static Model Empirical Results  
Variables Description of Variables Coefficients 
CTEMP Change in Total Employment  -0.466 
(0.299) 
UEMPG Unemployment Growth Rate  0.4200*** 
(0.138) 
CPCPI Change in Per-capita Income  -0.2399 
(0.356) 
POV  Percentage of Poverty  0.8289*** 
(0.784) 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 0.3152 
(0.297) 
PROWRA  Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act  
-0.5177 
(1.956) 
GOV  Political Affiliation of Governor  -0.6039 
(0.756) 
RD2 Region 2  3.8610*** 
(0.947) 
RD3 Region 3 0.4659 
(0.372) 
RD4 Region 4 1.1667** 
(0.515) 
RD5 Region 5 2.3968*** 
(0.661) 
Trend  Time  -1.5978 
(1.110) 
Constant  -49.9097 
 
Adjusted R2  0.746 
 
*** and ** denotes  level statistical significance at 1 percent and  
       at 5 percent respectively. Values in the parenthesis denote standard errors.  
 
The type of jobs created in the economy could also determine who would be 
employed. The expansion of employment might be concentrated in certain sectors which 
might need highly skilled and educated people. The economic expansion might create 
very little employment opportunities in some sectors such as construction, retailers and 
agriculture where most of the unskilled and uneducated labor might get a job. Therefore, 
even if employment opportunities expand, existing FSP participants still continue 
participating in the program or new people might enter in the FSP. 
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The other possible explanation is with regard to the composition of household 
participants. The significant proportion of participants in the FSP might be single-parent 
headed household, senior citizens, disabled, or able-bodied individuals with dependent in 
which a work requirement is not applicable for their participation and therefore the 
expansion of the economy might not significantly affect their participation. 
Dependence on the welfare program could also be a possible explanation. In this 
case, participants might calculate the benefit of working more hours and increasing 
income against losing FS benefit and other welfare benefits as FSP participants could 
also be beneficiaries of other welfare programs. Thus, an increase of income due to 
working long hours or having multiple jobs not only affects their eligibility in the FSP or 
amount of FS benefit, but also affects participation in other welfare programs. Therefore, 
if the increase in income is marginal and still make them disqualified for FSP 
participation and other welfare programs or lowers their benefit level, participants might 
not desire to work after certain income level. However, the above possible explanations 
are not supported by the data and statistical evidences.  
Change in per-capita personal income (CPCPI) has an insignificant relationship 
with FSP. This result is different from the hypothesis that county level income growth 
will decrease FSP participation. County per-capita income is used as a proxy for FSP 
participants’ income. This result is unexpected, as more FSP participation is expected 
with falling incomes. The result shows that income increase does not guarantee life out of 
food insecurity. This suggests that increase in income of low income working households 
is very minimal that they still need food assistance. The increase in income might not be 
proportional for all of the households in the county. The rate of growth of income for 
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certain group of people might be higher and the rate would be low or constant for low 
income families. In this case, even if county income increases, it doesn’t have significant 
impact on participation.   
Poverty (POV) has the expected positive effect on FSP. It is statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. An increase in county’s population living in poverty by one 
percent is expected to increase the FSP participants by 0.82 percent, ceteris paribus. This 
direct relationship may indicate that the distribution of poverty across counties affects the 
distribution of FS beneficiaries across counties. This result supports the hypothesis that 
poverty has a direct relationship with FSP participation. 
The cost of living was expected to affect the decision of eligible participants to 
increase their participation. The consumer price index (CPI) is used as the proxy for the 
cost of living. The result indicates that the effect of CPI on FSP participation decision, 
after controlling for the other factors, is statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
during the study period in West Virginia, change in cost of living has no significant role 
in determining the FSP participation decision of eligible households. This result does not 
support the hypothesis that FSP participation and the cost of living are directly related. 
Different policy changes may affect FSP participation and the potential effect of 
policy changes are likely to vary considerably across different types of households or 
individuals. The introduction of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) is expected to reduce FSP participation at least for two 
groups: non-citizens and able-bodied individuals without children between the ages of 
18-49. However, PRWORA is found to be statistically insignificant indicating that FSP 
participation is not systematically different before and after the introduction of PRWORA 
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in West Virginia.  Even though demographic variables are not included in the model, the 
result might suggest something about the characteristics of food stamp recipients in West 
Virginia. FSP participants might be composed of group of individuals or households who 
are able-bodied individuals without dependents that fulfill the work requirement but their 
income is very low to make them eligible and participate in the program. Moreover, it 
might suggest that FSP participants could also be comprised of able-bodied individuals 
with dependent, senior citizens or disabled individuals that the policy didn’t influence or 
limit their eligibility. Similarly, the proportion of immigrant FSP participants might be 
very low that the termination of their benefit does not change the overall participation.  
However, these arguments can be supported better with detailed demographic data that 
accounts for demographic information. In general, the result does not support the 
hypothesis that PRWORA policy helps in reducing FSP participation.   
Following similar researches, the political variable (GOV) is included in the 
model to control people’s attitude that may have an effect on FSP participation. Based on 
the result of previous researches, it is expected that if Democratic governor comes to 
office, more people participate in the FSP. However, the finding shows that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between FSP and the political affiliation of governors 
in office. The result suggests that political affiliation of the governor might not be one of 
the factors that affect FSP participation decisions.    
RD2, RD3, RD4 and RD5 represent dummy variables of Western region, 
Northern region, Southern region and Central region, respectively. The Eastern region 
(RD1) is considered as a base region. The percent of the people participating in FSP in 
Western (RD2), Southern (RD4), and Central (RD5) regions are significantly higher than 
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percentage of FSP participants in the Eastern (RD1) region. FSP participation in Western 
and Central region is statistically significant at 1 percent level and southern region at 5 
percent level respectively. As compared to Eastern region, FSP participation in Western 
region is higher by 3.86 percent, keeping other variables constant. Similarly, FSP 
participants in Southern and Central regions are higher than the Eastern region by 1.16 
and 2.39 percent, ceteris paribus, respectively. However, the dummy variable that 
represents Northern region FSP is not significant, meaning there is no significant FSP 
participation difference between Northern and Eastern regions. The fast economic 
expansion of the Eastern region (Eastern panhandle) could be one of the factors 
contributing to the higher level of FSP participation in the rest of the regions as compared 
to the Eastern region.   
The coefficient of the trend variable is negative and statistically insignificant. The 
trend variable is introduced to isolate increasing or decreasing FSP participation trends 
from the data and measure the remaining independent variables’ relationship with the 
dependent variable more accurately. The result reveals that there is no systematic trend in 
FSP participation in the study period.  
 
5.2.2 Dynamic Model Results  
The dynamic model explains variations in FSP by the explanatory variables of  lagged 
and current change in total employment (LG1CTEMP and CTEM ), lagged and current 
unemployment rate (LG1UEMPG and UEMPG), lagged and current change in  per-capita 
personal income (LG1CPCPI and CPCPI), lagged and current poverty (LG1POV and 
POV), lagged and current consumer price index (LG1CPI and CPI), dummy variables for 
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
governors political affiliation (GOV), and the lag change in dependent variable 
(LG1CFSP). This specification explains 75.7 percent of the variation in FSP. The 
estimated coefficients are given in Table 5.2.  
Current unemployment rate (UEMPG) is positively and significantly related with 
FSP participation. A one unit increase in the county unemployment rate is expected to 
increase FSP participation by 0.35 percent. The result suggests that people instantly 
participate in the program in adverse economic situations. This result is robust and 
consistent with the result of the static model. Counties with high unemployment rates are 
expected to have a high percentage of people participate in the FSP. However, one-period 
lagged unemployment rate (LG1UEMP) is statically insignificant. The result suggests 
that current employment growth is responsive to FSP participation without taking long 
time. Similar to the static model, the hypothesis that unemployment rate has a direct 
relationship with FSP participation is statistically supported. However, the relationship 
with lagged unemployment rate is not also supported. 
Similar to the findings in the static model, employment change (CTEMP) has no 
significant effect on FSP participation. Similar explanation as the static model can hold 
true in this case too. However, one-period lag change in total employment (LG1CTEMP) 
has significant influence on FSP participation. Employment change in current period may 
not have immediate effect on the same period of FSP participation. However, 
employment growth in the past period would significantly reduce FSP participation in the 
current period. The hypothesis that FSP has an inverse relationship with employment 
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growth is not supported by the statistical results. However, lagged employment growth 
has a significant and indirect relationship with FSP participation. 
Table 5.2 Dynamic Model Empirical Results 
Variables Description of Variables  Coefficients 
CTEMP Change in Total Employment  -0.649 
(0.235) 
UEMPG Unemployment Growth Rate  0.350*** 
(0.144) 
CPCPI Change in Per-capita Income  -0.386 
(0.341) 
POV  Percentage of Poverty  0.177 
(0.151) 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 1.168*** 
(0.395) 
 
PRWORA  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act  
-7.713*** 
(2.883) 
GOV  Political Affiliation of Governor  -2.025* 
(1.147) 




LG1UEMP One Period Lag Unemployment Growth Rate 0.510 
(0.110) 
LG1CFSP One Period Lag FSP -0.448 
(0.408) 
LG1CPCI One period Lag Change in Per-capita Income -0.436 
(0.372) 
LG1POV One Period Lag of Percentage of Poverty 0.636*** 
(0.143) 
LG1CPI One Period Lag Consumer Price Index  1.034*** 
(0.221) 
RD2 Region 2  3.607*** 
(0.915) 
RD3 Region 3 0.321 
(0.361) 
RD4 Region 4 1.042** 
(0.508) 
RD5 Region 5 2.021*** 
(0.593) 





Adjusted R2  0.757 
***, ** and * denotes level statistical significance at 1 5, and 10 percent respectively.  
                      Values in the parenthesis denote standard errors.  
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Both current and one-period lagged per-capita personal income (CPCPI and 
LG1PCPI) are not significant in determining FSP participation. The same explanation 
given in the static model also applies here. 
Current FSP participation is negatively and insignificantly related with its one-
period lagged FSP (LG1CFSP). It was expected that, holding other things constant, last 
period FS participants are more likely to participate in current period too. However, the 
results indicate that last period FSP participants may not likely participate in current 
period. The result suggests about the length of time that FSP participants stay in the 
program and the frequency of entrance and exit in the program. However, questions such 
as how frequently households participate in FSP and how long they stay in the program 
could not be explained by the data set the study relies on.       
The result indicates that LG1POV directly and positively influence FSP 
participation. It is statistically significant at 1 percent level. As last period’s percentage of 
people live in poverty increase by 1, the percentage of people that participate in FSP 
increases by 0.64. However, the finding indicated that current level of poverty (POV) 
does not have an impact on current FSP participation. This finding is unexpected and 
inconsistent with static model result. The dynamic model supports the hypothesis that 
there is a direct relationship between poverty and FSP participation, but only if poverty is 
a lagged variable. 
Unlike the static model the policy variable of PRWORA is found to be 
statistically significant and has inverse relationship with FSP participation in this model. 
FSP participation is found to be systematically different before and after the introduction 
of PRWORA in West Virginia. The introduction of PRWORA affects participation of 
 73  
some group of people significantly and leads to the decline of FSP participation. 
However, due to unavailability of demographic data which group of people’s 
participation is affected more is not known.  This result is consistent with the national 
trend of the impact of PRWORA policy on FSP participation. Unlike the static model, the 
dynamic model supports the hypothesis that PRWORA has an inverse relationship with 
FSP participation. 
The finding indicates that the relationship between FSP participation and the 
coming of Democrat governor in the office is negative and statistically significant at 10 
percent. This might be related to the introduction of PRWORA in 1996 and its 
implication on the change of eligibility of certain group of people. As discussed in the 
chapter 2, the introduction of PRWORA led to an unprecedented decline in FSP 
participation nationwide by limiting benefit for some group of people. Similarly the 
finding of this study indicated that FSP participation in West Virginia also declined after 
the introduction of PRWORA. Based on the previous experience of restrictive eligibility 
requirement and prohibition of certain groups that came with the introduction of 
PRWORA, people might associate what has happened during the Clinton administration 
with the coming of Democrat governor. People, therefore, might perceive that eligibility 
criteria would be very restricted and might decide not to participate or exit the FSP. 
Dummy variables that represent Western, Southern and Central regions are found 
to be statistically significant. This indicates that the percentage of FSP participation in 
Western, Southern and Central regions was higher as compared to percentage of FSP 
participation in Eastern region (the base of comparison). The percentage of FS 
participants in Western region is higher by 3.6, ceteris paribus, than the percentage of 
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participants in Eastern region. Similarly, percentages of FS participants in Southern and 
Central regions are higher by 1.04 and 2.02, ceteris paribus, respectively as compared to 
the Eastern region. The result also shows that the dummy variable that represents 
northern region is not significant; indicating that participation rates in northern West 
Virginia is not statistically different from the base region. These results reveal the 
existence of significant differences in food stamp participation patterns in different 
regions of West Virginia. This conclusion is supported by the static model results as well 
and the explanation provided in the static model also applied in this model too. 
Unlike the static model, the trend variable is statistically significant in the 
dynamic model. This indicates that FSP participation has been decreasing through time. 
The inclusion of trend variable controls for systematic decrease of FSP participation 



















SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
In this study, the empirical analysis of county FSP patterns is introduced using static and 
dynamic econometric models. The results of these models on county socio-economic and 
policy explanatory variables are also discussed. The general findings of the study can be 
summarized as follows:  
• County poverty levels affect the degree of county dependence on FSP. A rise in 
county poverty results in an increase in FSP participation. 
• The distribution of economic opportunities affects county level FSP participation. 
A rise in current and lagged county unemployment rate increases the degree of 
dependence on food stamp programs. In contrary, lagged employment growth 
tends to decrease FS dependence.  
• Both lagged and current county income growth does not seem to deter people 
from benefiting from the FSP.   
• The cost of living in general affects participation decision in county welfare 
programs. Increase in lagged consumer price index, measuring a rise in the cost of 
living, is associated with increasing dependence in county FSP participation. 
• Welfare program policies can have impacts in terms of flow of county welfare 
participants. PRWORA (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act) policy aims at limiting food stamp benefits to certain 
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beneficiary groups. Based on the dynamic model result, this policy is associated 
with reduced food stamp participants in West Virginia.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
• Political affiliation of governors is another policy factor considered. Based on the 
dynamic model result, unlike findings from previous studies, degree of FSP 
participation decreased during Democrat governors’ period.  
• There are differences on food stamp program participation levels across different 
regions in West Virginia. A region specific participation comparison indicates 
that significant regional differences in degree of FSP participation. 
 Based on the above general results in this study, it is possible to note the              
following: 
- It is important to conduct detail study about the demographic characteristics of 
people who live in poverty. Understanding the characteristics of the poor such as 
their employment status and age, help to design a policy that might have a long 
term impact for different groups. Likewise, it is important to understand FSP 
participation rate to determine whether the program has been safety net for the 
majority of the poor households.  
- It is also important to understand and identify the skill composition and educational 
level of low income households and design policies to attract such job where these 
people can be absorbed in the job market and ultimately improve their wellbeing.  
- Finally, it is important to reach out to eligible households by conducting outreach 
programs to provide information and change the perception of relationship between 
eligibility and the county or state political situation.  
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 Therefore, based on the above results and conclusions, it is recommended that:  
 First, county level determinants of FSP tend to be long term economic indicators, like 
poverty and income growth. As such, policies that aim at addressing welfare programs in 
general and FSP in particular, may better address welfare dependence by designing long-
term programs that mitigate the long-term economic parameters of poverty, income, 
unemployment, and employment growth.  
Second, not only is addressing long-term economic problems important to reduce 
long-term welfare dependence, but also understanding the distribution of economic 
variables is crucial. Though knowing the level of poverty, for instance, is helpful in 
tackling welfare dependence, understanding its cross-county distribution may help 
prioritize welfare funds and allocation of capital to tackle this problem in a systematic 
manner.  
Third, the significant regional differences in FSP participation indicate the 
existence of difference in regional economic performance. Regional specific economic 
initiatives especially for economically stressed areas might be helpful in addressing the 
problem. 
Fourth, the cost of living and political affiliation of governors could be important 
determinants of FSP. However, these are short-term parameters with perhaps limited 
impact compared to the deep-rooted long-term economic problems. As such, proper focus 
may be necessary in terms of addressing short-term participation triggering factors and 
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6.2 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
The main limitation of the study is the unavailability of data. Due to the emphasis of the 
study on the county level data, detailed economic variable information about FSP 
participant is not effectively captured. Moreover, due to lack of time-series demographic 
information, the relationship between FSP participation and demographic characteristics 
is not properly captured.  The following can be suggested as areas further improvement.  
           Regional Interdependence: economic variables may have significant 
interdependence across counties. For instance, income growth in one county may affect 
the level of neighboring county. Therefore a spatial econometric model approach might 
be important to understand economic interdependence among counties.   
           Data: Aggregate economic and secondary data might not be a good measure of 
economic condition of specific. Thus conducting survey targeting specific groups might 
provide more accurate relationship and result. Moreover, expanding the time frame of the 
study may help estimate the relationship using advanced method of estimations.   
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Appendix A: Restricted 2R Test 
 
Testing the significance of fixed effect.  
 
Ho: Restricted model is appropriate  
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Where T = the number of temporal observation  
            n = number of counties  
            k = number of parameters   
 
 
A. 1 Static Model  
 
calF   =  6.56 and F  = 2.41. calF > F  .Rejected H0, therefore Fixed effect model is the 
valid model.  
 
A. 2 Dynamic Model  
 
calF   =  3.72 and F = 2.04 . calF > F . Reject H0, therefore fixed effect model is the valid 
model.  
 
Table A-1 Pooled Regression of Static Model  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =   9, Deg.Fr.=    376 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 4974.470796    , Std.Dev.=        3.63730 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .716753, Adjusted R-squared =          .71073 | 
| Model test: F[  8,    376] =  118.93,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -1038.8663, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.606, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.443 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .42381,   Rho =       .78810 | 
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of  1 periods   | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -58.60184505       47.053661   -1.245   .2138 
 CTEMP    -.4040747627E-03  .23605999E-03   -1.712   .0878     40.883117 
 UEMPG        .5172536190       .16369875    3.160   .0017     7.8251948 
 CPCPI    -.2315480963E-03  .37499258E-03    -.617   .5373     732.96623 
 POV          .8623918446   .85881196E-01   10.042   .0000     18.057403 
 CPI          .3723575867       .32137994    1.159   .2473     167.37143 
 PROWRA      -.6273475286       2.0966229    -.299   .7649     .85714286 
 GOV         -.6989846743       .80427996    -.869   .3854     .42857143 
 TREND       -1.771059577       1.2085097   -1.465   .1436     4.0000000 
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Table A-2 Fixed Effect Regression of Static Model 
 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  13, Deg.Fr.=    372 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 4313.430901    , Std.Dev.=        3.40518 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .754393, Adjusted R-squared =          .74647 | 
| Model test: F[ 12,    372] =   95.22,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -1011.4186, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.484, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.322 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .44735,   Rho =       .77633 | 
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of  1 periods   | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -49.90974775       43.588846   -1.145   .2529 
 CTEMP    -.4657961069E-03  .29877327E-03   -1.559   .1198     40.883117 
 UEMPG        .4199881051       .13784838    3.047   .0025     7.8251948 
 CPCPI    -.2399492915E-03  .35624487E-03    -.674   .5010     732.96623 
 POV          .8288767324   .78435953E-01   10.568   .0000     18.057403 
 CPI          .3152641559       .29713907    1.061   .2894     167.37143 
 PROWRA      -.5176585293       1.9555738    -.265   .7914     .85714286 
 GOV         -.6038663406       .75641076    -.798   .4252     .42857143 
 RD2          3.860993631       .94673144    4.078   .0001     .18181818 
 RD3          .4659155719       .37188407    1.253   .2110     .27272727 
 RD4          1.166711084       .51464397    2.267   .0240     .20000000 
 RD5          2.396845601       .66080121    3.627   .0003     .14545455 
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Table A-3 Pooled Regression of Dynamic Model  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  15, Deg.Fr.=    370 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 4618.235745    , Std.Dev.=        3.53295 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .737037, Adjusted R-squared =          .72709 | 
| Model test: F[ 14,    370] =   74.07,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -1024.5623, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.562, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.400 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .38353,   Rho =       .80824 | 
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of  1 periods   | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -275.2033303       87.355725   -3.150   .0018 
 CTEMP     .1522887490E-03  .24178201E-03     .630   .5292     40.883117 
 UEMPG        .4252315221       .16908563    2.515   .0123     7.8251948 
 CPCPI    -.4392837402E-03  .36318767E-03   -1.210   .2272     732.96623 
 POV          .1851449716       .16500719    1.122   .2626     18.057403 
 CPI          .9704774918       .40416833    2.401   .0168     167.37143 
 PROWRA      -5.914751592       3.0115332   -1.964   .0503     .85714286 
 GOV         -1.094024023       1.2414095    -.881   .3787     .42857143 
 LG1CTEMP -.5205238440E-03  .23198729E-03   -2.244   .0254     129.29870 
 LG1UEMP   .7655361369E-01      .12014895     .637   .5244     8.2620779 
 LG1CFSP  -.1105772609E-02  .46559314E-03   -2.375   .0181    -287.22597 
 LG1CPCPI -.5577853109E-03  .39449036E-03   -1.414   .1582     756.37143 
 LG1POV       .6459138715       .16966964    3.807   .0002     18.782727 
 LG1CPI       .8951295027       .25341544    3.532   .0005     162.84286 























 88  
Table A-4 Fixed Effect Regression of Dynamic Model  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  19, Deg.Fr.=    366 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 4066.731727    , Std.Dev.=        3.33336 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .768440, Adjusted R-squared =          .75705 | 
| Model test: F[ 18,    366] =   67.48,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -1000.0815, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.456, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.294 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .38076,   Rho =       .80962 | 
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of  1 periods   | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -323.6018891       82.740463   -3.911   .0001 
 CTEMP    -.6487514339E-05  .23474631E-03    -.028   .9780     40.883117 
 UEMPG        .3496998122       .14489105    2.414   .0163     7.8251948 
 CPCPI    -.3865787048E-03  .34113635E-03   -1.133   .2579     732.96623 
 POV          .1773559642       .15078659    1.176   .2403     18.057403 
 CPI          1.168199138       .39483217    2.959   .0033     167.37143 
 PROWRA      -7.713458844       2.8832939   -2.675   .0078     .85714286 
 GOV         -2.024732277       1.1470406   -1.765   .0784     .42857143 
 LG1CTEMP -.4942657588E-03  .29475911E-03   -1.677   .0944     129.29870 
 LG1UEMP   .5104709149E-01      .11039927     .462   .6441     8.2620779 
 LG1CFSP  -.4478105052E-03  .40842398E-03   -1.096   .2736    -287.22597 
 LG1CPCPI -.4360957297E-03  .37176329E-03   -1.173   .2415     756.37143 
 LG1POV       .6359747850       .14314275    4.443   .0000     18.782727 
 LG1CPI       1.033935905       .22126909    4.673   .0000     162.84286 
 RD2          3.607076017       .91544562    3.940   .0001     .18181818 
 RD3          .3213958958       .36151165     .889   .3746     .27272727 
 RD4          1.042889231       .50853726    2.051   .0410     .20000000 
 RD5          2.020989075       .59297286    3.408   .0007     .14545455 
 TREND       -9.145479883       2.2269679   -4.107   .0000     4.0000000 
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Appendix B: Testing for Multicollinearity Using Pair-Wise Correlation 
 
Table B-1 Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix of Static Model  
             
            UEMPG      CPI      POV    CTEMP    CPCPI 
   UEMPG  1.00000  -.28898   .62601  -.18238  -.39721 
     CPI  -.28898  1.00000  -.21989  -.14884   .20099 
     POV   .62601  -.21989  1.00000  -.10624  -.25284 
   CTEMP  -.18238  -.14884  -.10624  1.00000   .21371 




     
 
Table B-2 Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix of Dynamic Model Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix   
                 of Dynamic Model 
 
             
            CTEMP    UEMPG    CPCPI      POV      CPI LG1CTEMP  LG1UEMP  LG1CFSP 
   CTEMP  1.00000  -.18238   .21371  -.10624  -.14884   .00751  -.06759   .10145 
   UEMPG  -.18238  1.00000  -.39721   .62601  -.28898  -.27474   .87685   .10208 
   CPCPI   .21371  -.39721  1.00000  -.25284   .20099   .13412  -.23261  -.21050 
     POV  -.10624   .62601  -.25284  1.00000  -.21989  -.27396   .64144   .07722 
     CPI  -.14884  -.28898   .20099  -.21989  1.00000   .08085  -.38279  -.06344 
LG1CTEMP   .00751  -.27474   .13412  -.27396   .08085  1.00000  -.29709  -.22196 
 LG1UEMP  -.06759   .87685  -.23261   .64144  -.38279  -.29709  1.00000   .10276 
 LG1CFSP   .10145   .10208  -.21050   .07722  -.06344  -.22196   .10276  1.00000 
  
            CTEMP    UEMPG    CPCPI      POV      CPI LG1CTEMP  LG1UEMP  LG1CFSP 
LG1CPCPI  -.03499  -.28153   .02714  -.24860   .42374   .13828  -.43977   .06719 
  LG1POV  -.12006   .64597  -.29065   .95821  -.30654  -.25329   .67830   .07446 
  LG1CPI  -.16890  -.26838   .14712  -.20698   .98317   .07337  -.39446  -.07107 
 
         LG1CPCPI   LG1POV   LG1CPI 
LG1CPCPI  1.00000  -.31103   .46946 
  LG1POV  -.31103  1.00000  -.31777 





















 90  
Appendix C: Testing For Using White’s Test 
 
 
Static Model White Test  
 
Table C-1 Static Model White’s Test  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = ERSTASQR Mean=   11.20371663    , S.D.=   50.29516872     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  21, Deg.Fr.=    364 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 879522.5249    , Std.Dev.=       49.15558 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .094553, Adjusted R-squared =          .04480 | 
| Model test: F[ 20,    364] =    1.90,    Prob value =          .01158 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -2035.0654, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -2054.1857 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    7.843, Akaike Info. Crt.=     10.681 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .72934,   Rho =       .63533 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant     879.1616731       1184.0798     .742   .4583 
 UEMPG        34.07206533       22.511665    1.514   .1310     7.8251948 
 CPI         -12.20446239       13.792410    -.885   .3768     167.37143 
 POV          1.856202768       14.854041     .125   .9006     18.057403 
 CTEMP    -.9406360421E-02      .17035844    -.055   .9560     40.883117 
 CPCPI     .2982167705E-01      .14717495     .203   .8395     732.96623 
 UEMPGSQR     .6196016417       .33097161    1.872   .0620     71.642571 
 CPISQR    .3873155618E-01  .40654219E-01     .953   .3414     28093.914 
 POVSQR       .2296361721   .92597015E-01    2.480   .0136     351.98558 
 CTEMPSQR  .1522805724E-05  .27305144E-05     .558   .5774     263903.90 
 CPCPISQR  .1893781697E-05  .72666332E-05     .261   .7945     777416.41 
 UEMPGCPI    -.1036054988       .12592267    -.823   .4112     1301.3376 
 UEMPGPOV    -1.275693147       .39959829   -3.192   .0015     151.58434 
 UEMPCEMP -.3629074360E-02  .38683274E-02    -.938   .3488     18.597403 
 UEMPCPCI  .1523692692E-02  .28309158E-02     .538   .5907     5107.5665 
 CPIPOV   -.4217040739E-02  .81686557E-01    -.052   .9589     3012.2359 
 CPICEMP   .2297241400E-03  .96109407E-03     .239   .8112     6157.9039 
 CPICPCPI -.5859084430E-04  .81792170E-03    -.072   .9429     123562.57 
 POVCEMP   .2015873971E-03  .23187613E-02     .087   .9308     461.29610 
 POVCPCPI -.1751908852E-02  .15973814E-02   -1.097   .2735     12604.672 




           H0: Homoscedasticity 
           H1: Heteroscedasticity 
 
nR2 = 385*.094553= 36.40 
 
Critical value from chi-square distribution table for 20 degree of freedom (# of 
right hand side repressors except the intercept) is 31.41. 
 
Since nR2 value of 36.40 is greater than the critical value of 31.41, the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected indicating the existence of 
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Table C-2 Dynamic Model of White’s Test  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  63, Deg.Fr.=    322 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 3633.076378    , Std.Dev.=        3.35899 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .793132, Adjusted R-squared =          .75330 | 
| Model test: F[ 62,    322] =   19.91,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =   -978.3752, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.575, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.410 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .84872,   Rho =       .57564 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant     161.9903666       119.36174    1.357   .1757 
 CTEMP     .1084257397E-01  .11841483E-01     .916   .3605     40.883117 
 UEMPG        3.943889514       3.1941557    1.235   .2178     7.8251948 
 CPCPI     .6394300877E-02  .11827028E-01     .541   .5891     732.96623 
 POV          1.727412496       6.3320217     .273   .7852     18.057403 
 CPI         -1.896428348       5.2863184    -.359   .7200     167.37143 
 LG1CTEMP -.9154436785E-02  .15063759E-01    -.608   .5438     129.29870 
 LG1UEMP     -3.067845753       3.1303245    -.980   .3278     8.2620779 
 LG1CFSP  -.2200252059E-01  .14681380E-01   -1.499   .1349    -287.22597 
 LG1CPCPI  .2871556256E-01  .15642857E-01    1.836   .0673     756.37143 
 LG1POV       .5835863301       6.5542390     .089   .9291     18.782727 
 LG1CPI      -.4079332081       4.7983788    -.085   .9323     162.84286 
 LGUNEMSQ -.3577690286E-01  .51525683E-01    -.694   .4880     80.299247 
 LGPOVSQR  .5353966209E-01  .37313561E-01    1.435   .1523     382.05303 
 LGCEMPSQ -.3643354569E-06  .34984182E-06   -1.041   .2985     301494.03 
 LGCPCISQ -.6773753887E-06  .87879991E-06    -.771   .4414     784268.18 
 LGCPISQR -.1193618872E-01  .32161146E-01    -.371   .7108     26608.090 
 LGCFSPSQ -.3090503296E-06  .45830226E-06    -.674   .5006     399991.06 
 UEMLGEMP -.1894491348E-03  .66251711E-03    -.286   .7751     538.77143 
 UEMLGPCI  .5658341752E-05  .42251959E-03     .013   .9893     5500.3810 
 UEMLGPOV    -.1047754538   .36872775E-01   -2.842   .0048     158.25225 
 UEMLGCPI -.1548417509E-01  .19120396E-01    -.810   .4186     1266.0494 
 UEMLGUEM  .6591280232E-01  .57432091E-01    1.148   .2520     74.467429 
 UEMLGFSP -.1504822163E-02  .44219959E-03   -3.403   .0008    -2062.0319 
 CPILGEMP  .3494141858E-03  .50189014E-03     .696   .4868     22028.561 
 CPILGPCI -.6530587033E-03  .47515680E-03   -1.374   .1703     128348.58 
 CPILGPOV -.8854001226E-01  .46432343E-01   -1.907   .0574     3128.7937 
 CPILGCPI  .1906661873E-01  .33482983E-01     .569   .5695     27339.177 
 CPILGUEM     .1062170768   .62805604E-01    1.691   .0918     1370.9037 
 CPILGFSP  .3401955156E-03  .37981577E-03     .896   .3711    -48394.563 
 POVLGEMP  .5243060641E-03  .78176287E-03     .671   .5029     1590.5351 
 POVLGPCI  .1990088725E-03  .41441178E-03     .480   .6314     13075.157 
 POVLGPOV -.5378353420E-01  .38435228E-01   -1.399   .1627     365.55455 
 POVLGCPI -.5128900430E-02  .36664899E-01    -.140   .8888     2930.5067 
 POVLGUEM  .5795110543E-01  .64606291E-01     .897   .3704     160.52088 
 POVLGFSP  .8247116808E-03  .51706889E-03    1.595   .1117    -4965.0475 
 EMPLGEMP -.2284361401E-06  .82751582E-06    -.276   .7827     7337.9221 
 EMPLGPCI  .1860920110E-06  .85889059E-06     .217   .8286     22669.377 
 EMPLGPOV -.2566916737E-03  .18666021E-03   -1.375   .1700     435.30649 
 EMPLGCPI -.5815620302E-04  .70618097E-04    -.824   .4108     5835.6442 
 EMPLGUEM  .5229660485E-03  .32464735E-03    1.611   .1082     217.69351 
 EMPLGFSP  .2380954675E-06  .79375102E-06     .300   .7644     17528.805 
 PCILGEMP -.2461156692E-05  .14931997E-05   -1.648   .1003     129847.79 
 PCILGPCI -.1922937823E-06  .11402921E-05    -.169   .8662     560522.30 
 PCILGPOV  .9406127757E-05  .16853355E-03     .056   .9555     12996.580 
 PCILGCPI -.1646791240E-04  .70629584E-04    -.233   .8158     120043.45 
 PCILGUEM -.5927926486E-03  .25629465E-03   -2.313   .0214     5660.3182 
 PCILGFSP -.1160877099E-05  .13648588E-05    -.851   .3957    -268654.70 
 LGEMLGPC -.2832601354E-05  .14250817E-05   -1.988   .0477     131788.21 
 LGEMLGPO -.3277416957E-03  .74989096E-03    -.437   .6624     1697.3961 
 LGEMLGCP -.2648318989E-03  .51322116E-03    -.516   .6062     21427.397 
 LGEMLGUE -.5305058172E-03  .64606415E-03    -.821   .4122     518.22078 
 LGEMLGFS -.7141058766E-06  .71709309E-06    -.996   .3201    -103878.88 
 LGPCLGPO -.3477290929E-03  .44595489E-03    -.780   .4361     13431.719 
 LGPCLGCP  .5268953858E-03  .47446816E-03    1.110   .2676     125224.48 
 LGPCLGUE -.1039526295E-04  .41436120E-03    -.025   .9800     5546.4023 
 LGPCLGFS  .3460267989E-05  .15393961E-05    2.248   .0253    -199810.37 
 LGPOLGCP  .9142924275E-01  .50164995E-01    1.823   .0693     3042.2987 
 LGPOLGUE -.1997123788E-01  .68238059E-01    -.293   .7700     167.91473 
 LGPOLGFS -.3263795037E-03  .53449172E-03    -.611   .5419    -5167.9331 
 LGCPLGUE -.8996156336E-01  .62914670E-01   -1.430   .1537     1332.4158 
 LGCPLGFS -.2338567608E-03  .39650955E-03    -.590   .5557    -47153.243 
 LGUELGFS  .2396613707E-03  .46820376E-03     .512   .6091    -2172.2036 




nR2 = 385*.793132= 305.356 
 
Critical value from chi-square distribution table for 63 degree of freedom (# of right hand 
side repressors except the intercept) is ≈ 80. 
 
Since nR2 value of 305.356 is greater than the critical value of ≈ 80, the null hypothesis 
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Appendix D: Testing for Autocorrelation 
 
 
Table D-1 Static Model Fixed Effect Regression  
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = FSP      Mean=   15.23257686    , S.D.=   6.762783986     | 
| Model size: Observations =     385, Parameters =  13, Deg.Fr.=    372 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 4313.430901    , Std.Dev.=        3.40518 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .754393, Adjusted R-squared =          .74647 | 
| Model test: F[ 12,    372] =   95.22,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =  -1011.4186, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =   -1281.6930 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    2.484, Akaike Info. Crt.=      5.322 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =    .44735,   Rho =       .77633 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -49.90974775       44.733600   -1.116   .2653 
 CTEMP    -.4657961069E-03  .36101646E-03   -1.290   .1978     40.883117 
 UEMPG        .4199881051   .77717570E-01    5.404   .0000     7.8251948 
 CPCPI    -.2399492915E-03  .43705061E-03    -.549   .5833     732.96623 
 POV          .8288767324   .56914490E-01   14.564   .0000     18.057403 
 CPI          .3152641559       .30502722    1.034   .3020     167.37143 
 PROWRA      -.5176585293       2.0104307    -.257   .7969     .85714286 
 GOV         -.6038663406       .87520897    -.690   .4906     .42857143 
 RD2          3.860993631       .58377015    6.614   .0000     .18181818 
 RD3          .4659155719       .52058373     .895   .3714     .27272727 
 RD4          1.166711084       .67343342    1.732   .0840     .20000000 
 RD5          2.396845601       .73947639    3.241   .0013     .14545455 
 TREND       -1.597838269       1.1645505   -1.372   .1709     4.0000000 
 
 
            Durbin Watson method is used to test the presence of autocorrelation of the static 
model. The Durbin-Watson statistic from the above regression is 0.44735. 
 
For n (sample size) and k-1 (number of parameters), dL (lower bound) & dU (upper 
bound) values can be referred from the Durbin-Watson table.  
 
The sample size is 385. The k-1 # of parameter is 13 – 1 = 12. The D-critical value is 
thus: dL (lower bound) = 1.69 & dU (upper bound) = 1.82.  
 
Test the hypothesis: 
 
H0: no positive autocorrelation 
Ha: positive autocorrelation exists 
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Appendix D-2 Testing Autocorrelation using  Breusch-Godfrey Test – Dynamic Model 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = none     | 
| Dep. var. = ERRORSTA Mean=   .1983467018E-01, S.D.=   3.186069224     | 
| Model size: Observations =     275, Parameters =  20, Deg.Fr.=    255 | 
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 96.30735341    , Std.Dev.=         .61455 | 
| Fit:        R-squared=  .965374, Adjusted R-squared =          .96279 | 
| Model test: F[ 19,    255] =  374.18,    Prob value =          .00000 | 
| Diagnostic: Log-L =   -245.9395, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =    -708.3739 | 
|             LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=    -.904, Akaike Info. Crt.=      1.934 | 
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =   2.04001,   Rho =      -.02000 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant    -440.5795871       26.278456  -16.766   .0000 
 UEMPG       -.4306812088   .30874693E-01  -13.949   .0000     7.3672727 
 CPI          1.143239563       .10240486   11.164   .0000     171.74000 
 POV         -.7440296047   .50993918E-01  -14.591   .0000     17.386545 
 GOV         -4.093108181       .44736027   -9.149   .0000     .40000000 
 RD2         -.2281483998       .13447041   -1.697   .0910     .18181818 
 RD3         -.1122191672       .11331196    -.990   .3229     .27272727 
 RD4      -.5551726368E-01      .15266827    -.364   .7164     .20000000 
 RD5         -.2408916267       .16009094   -1.505   .1336     .14545455 
 TREND       -11.22953059       .66144721  -16.977   .0000     5.0000000 
 CTEMP     .4422413938E-03  .77329310E-04    5.719   .0000     26.290909 
 CPCPI     .1667972679E-03  .95626873E-04    1.744   .0823     788.57455 
 LG1UEMP      .3629868457   .31692430E-01   11.453   .0000     7.5345455 
 LG1POV       .7415885297   .52269769E-01   14.188   .0000     17.565091 
 LG1CTEMP -.5841081337E-03  .11365677E-03   -5.139   .0000     131.74545 
 LG1CPCPI -.2864369899E-03  .10569857E-03   -2.710   .0072     860.77455 
 LG1CFSP  -.6698024851E-04  .93164927E-04    -.719   .4728    -369.82909 
 LG1CPI       1.803369191       .10511302   17.156   .0000     167.86000 
 ERRLAG1      .7862747209   .35869798E-01   21.920   .0000 -.60217113E-01 






 Ho: All coefficients are zero  
        (No autocorrelation) 
 Ha: All coefficients are not zero    
        (There is autocorrelation). 
 
Calculated statistics is given by: 
(n – p) R2 = (275 – 2) * 0.965374= 263.55 
 
Critical value from Chi-squared table for p=2 degree of freedom at 0.01 (1%) 
significance is: 9.21. 
 
Since calculated statistic of 263.55 > critical value of 9.21, it can be concluded that there 
is autocorrelation problem. 
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Appendix E:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table E-1 Static Model Descriptive Statistics.  
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
FSP 15.2325769 6.76278399 4.35233000 46.8138000 385 
CTEMP 40.8831169 512.752732 -4860.00000 3030.00000 385 
UEMPG 7.82519481 3.23048049 2.10000000 23.1000000 385 
PCPI 18890.5974 3639.84489 11665.0000 31923.0000 385 
POV 18.0574026 5.09738020 8.60000000 37.7000000 385 
CPI 167.371429 8.99607636 152.400000 179.900000 385 
PROWRA .857142857 .350382444 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
GOV .428571429 .495515604 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD2 .181818182 .386196488 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD3 .272727273 .445941293 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD4 .200000000 .400520495 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD5 .145454545 .353017297 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
TREND 4.00000000 2.00260247 1.00000000 1.00000000 385 
 
 
Table E-2 Dynamic Model Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
FSP 15.2325769 6.76278399 4.35233000 46.8138000 385 
CTEMP 40.8831169 512.752732 -4860.00000 3030.00000 385 
UEMPG 7.82519481 3.23048049 2.10000000 23.1000000 385 
CPCPI 732.966234 490.716177 -1105.00000 2580.00000 385 
POV 18.0574026 5.09738020 8.60000000 37.7000000 385 
CPI 167.371429 8.99607636 152.400000 179.900000 385 
LG1CTEMP 129.298701 534.338353 -6550.00000 3030.00000 385 
LG1UEMP 8.26207792 3.47399803 2.10000000 23.1000000 385 
LG1CFSP -287.225974 564.197751 -4683.00000 691.000000 385 
LG1CPCPI 756.371429 461.219003 -562.000000 2580.00000 385 
LG1POV 18.7827273 5.41649262 8.60000000 37.8000000 385 
LG1CPI 162.842857 9.51467382 148.200000 177.100000 385 
PROWRA .857142857 .350382444 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
GOV .428571429 .495515604 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD2 .181818182 .386196488 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD3 .272727273 .445941293 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD4 .200000000 .400520495 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
RD5 .145454545 .353017297 .000000000 1.00000000 385 
TREND 4.00000000 2.00260247 1.00000000 1.00000000 385 
 
 
 
